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I. INTRODUCTION 
The co-existence of tangible and intangible property is central to the 
regulation of information products. The commercialization of musical 
recordings, books, films, video games, computer software involves a 
duality between intangible and tangible property. The copyright holder 
owns the intellectual property rights to the literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work (intangible property), while the recipient of the information 
product would usually own (but not always) the copy to the information 
product (tangible property).1 At a broader level, information products 
embed an artistic, literary, functional, intangible component that prevails 
over their concrete, physical, and tangible embodiment.  
Increasingly, recipients have access to information products online, 
without a physical object embodiment (such as a paperbook, a CD, DVD, 
video, disc). One could easily predict that information products with no 
supporting physical object will soon outnumber (if they have not already) 
the ones that are embedded in a physical supporting medium.2 The online 
distribution of information products brings a different dimension to the 
traditional tangible and intangible property divide: the products that are 
offered with a physical supporting medium (associated to something 
tangible) are in several instances regulated differently from the ones that 
are not (i.e., of an immaterial character).  
Recipients have much to gain from the disembodiment of the 
information products that they enjoy at the tip of their fingers: freed 
physical space, flexibility with respect to how and when they access the 
information product, on which devices, with no physical degradation of 
their copy. At the same time, the disembodiment of information products 
breaks traditional boundaries and blurs the lines between suppliers and 
recipients. Do the recipients own the copies that they access online or 
                                                                                                                     
 1.  For a discussion on the nature of copies of copyright works and how they embed this 
duality, see Pascale Chapdelaine, Living in the Shadow of the Intangible: the Nature of the Copy 
of a Copyrighted Work Part One, 23 INTELL. PROP. J. 83 (2010) & Pascale Chapdelaine, Living in 
the Shadow of the Intangible: the Nature of the Copy of a Copyrighted Work Part Two, 23 INTELL. 
PROP. J. 205 (2011). 
 2.  See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual & Personal 
Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1238–45 (2015) (showing the transformation or 
“erosion” of copies of copyright works and the impact it has on copyright law). 
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rather, are they licensees of the copies? Do recipients benefit from a 
service or access a combination of goods and services? Are recipients’ 
access to information products restricted by suppliers’ digital locks or 
other technological protection measures? Do recipients benefit from 
implied conditions and warranties to the same way that they do when their 
information products are embedded in a physical object? These shifting 
lines of demarcation between suppliers and recipients beg the question: 
to what extent are recipients’ gains of convenience offset by changing 
rules of engagement? Are recipients gaining, or progressively losing 
power?  
The purpose of this Article is to critically analyze the root causes and 
justifications supporting the different treatment of information products 
that are embodied in a physical object from the ones that are not. The 
divide in the treatment of different forms of property is to a large extent 
arbitrary and we need to take a closer look at the profound effects that it 
may have on the regulation of information products, and the balance of 
powers between suppliers and recipients. Part II considers the effects of 
the overemphasis on a physical object in defining goods and services and 
the consequent rippling effects it has on enforcing sales and licenses. The 
Article will then delve into further illustrations of the emphasis on a 
physical object on the application of the first sale or exhaustion doctrine 
and on what exclusive copyright acts are involved in the 
commercialization of information products. Part III explains the root 
causes of the current overemphasis on the presence of a physical object 
through misconceptions of property and through the active role that 
suppliers play in shaping the nature of information products. I observe 
how the over emphasis on a physical object progressively decreases 
recipients’ ownership powers and privileges to information products, 
thereby creating double standards that may lead to a legal and normative 
degradation. Part IV proposes to redefine personal tangible property by 
looking at what its essential attributes should be. In particular, the concept 
of ownership “as an organizing idea,”3 should help discern when personal 
property rights of recipients of information products should be 
recognized and enforced in conjunction with the need to constrain the 
effects that supplier contracts have on the personal property rights of 
recipients of information products.  
II. THE DIVIDING LINE CREATED BY THE PRESENCE OF A 
PHYSICAL OBJECT 
Courts and legislatures have been grappling for some time with the 
                                                                                                                     
 3.  I refer to the theory of ownership developed by JAMES W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND 
JUSTICE (1996). 
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application of traditional legal doctrines to the immaterial world.4 The 
law of theft and the tort of conversion are examples that come to mind.5 
In the case of information products, the presence of a physical object has 
an impact on the qualification of information products as goods, with 
rippling effects on the enforcement of sales and licenses, on the 
application of the first sale or exhaustion doctrine, and on what exclusive 
copyright acts are involved in the commercialization of information 
products. 
A. Definition of Goods and Services 
Commercial copies of information products that are sold through the 
hand-to-hand supply of a physical medium (such as music CDs or film 
DVDs) are generally characterized as goods under sale of goods law.6 In 
doing so, courts have at times applied a reasoning by analogy and 
assimilation. Familiar objects such as discs and tapes, which have long 
been recognized as goods, justify that the predominant feature of the 
product—the musical recording, the film, or computer software—is also 
considered to be a good.  
By contrast, the applicability of sale of goods—(and consumer)—law-
implied obligations to digital content supplied online is still an unsettled 
area of the law.7 In sale of goods and consumer law, “goods” generally 
refer to (tangible) “chattels personal,” “personal property,” or, in civil law 
                                                                                                                     
 4.  See R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963 (Can. Ont.), where the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that confidential information could not be the subject of theft under s. 283 of Canada’s 
Criminal Code. See also SARAH GREEN & JOHN RANDALL, THE TORT OF CONVERSION 118–43 
(2009). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Numerous cases in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom have 
recognized that copies of information products embedded in a physical medium are “goods” often 
in cases involving the application of sale of goods law implied obligations. See, e.g., Gerber 
Scientific Instrument Co. v. Bell-N. Research, Ltd. (1991), 5 B.L.R. (2d) 20, 1991 CarswellOnt 
149 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Lalese Enters., Inc. v. Arete Techs., Inc. (1994), 59 C.P.R. (3d) 438, 1994 
CarswellBC 1220 (B.C. S.C.); W. Eng’g Serv., Ltd. v. Canada Malting Co., 50 A.C.W.S. (3d) 
345, 1994 CarswellOnt 3090; Classified Directory Publishers, Inc. v. Image Mgmt. Techs., Inc., 
1995 CarswellOnt 2449 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Michael’s Pizzeria, Ltd. v. LP Computer Solutions, 
Inc., 139 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 295, 433 A.P.R. 295, 1996 CarswellPEI 31 (P.E.I. T.D.); Villeseche v. 
Total N. Commc’n, Ltd., 1997 CarswellYukon 53 (Y.C.A.); W.J. Caul Funeral Home, 
Ltd. v. Pearce (1997), 475 A.P.R. 252 (Nfld. T.D.); Saskatoon Gold Brokers, Inc. v. Datatec 
Computer Sys., Ltd. (1986), 55 Sask. R. 241, 1986 CarswellSask 401 (Sask. Q.B.); in the United 
States, see RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); in the United 
Kingdom, see St. Albans City & Dist. Council v. Int’l Computers, Ltd., [1996] EWCA (Civ.) 
1296 (Eng.); Kingsway Hall Hotel, Ltd. v. Red Sky IT (Hounslow), Ltd., 2010 WL 1639690 (QB). 
 7.  See MARCO B.M. LOOS ET AL., FINAL REPORT: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, LAW & 
ECONOMICS ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSSIBLE 
FUTURE RULES ON DIGITAL CONTENT CONTRACTS 32 (2011) (analyzing the laws of 11 countries, 
including the United States, United Kingdom, France, and other European states).  
2015] THE UNDUE RELIANCE ON PHYSICAL OBJECTS 69 
 
jurisdictions, “movable property,”8 and often exclude “things in action.”9 
As a result, the qualification of information products as goods still largely 
depends on the definition of tangible property and “choses in action” or 
intangible property.  
If copies of information products distributed online with no 
supporting physical media are not goods under the relevant statutory 
provisions of sale of goods and consumer laws, they cannot benefit from 
the protection mechanisms offered through implied sale of goods and 
consumer obligations.10 This limits the protection to any remaining 
                                                                                                                     
 8.  Québec Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P.40.1, art. 1(d) (Can.) [hereinafter 
QCPA] defines goods as “any movable property,” which is defined in Civil Code of Quebec, 
CQLR, c. C-1991, art. 905 (Can.) [hereinafter CCQ], as “[t]hings which can be moved either by 
themselves or by an extrinsic force.” Art. 907 CCQ states that all other property, if not qualified 
by law is movable. Thus the definition of goods is broad and would include incorporeal property 
(art. 899 CCQ). In France, CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION, art. L211 provides that the provisions 
dealing with warranties of conformity apply to movable, corporeal property. Other articles of the 
CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION, for instance, the ones dealing with information disclosure 
requirements (L111) and the ones dealing with unfair commercial practices (L120) refer to 
“property” which is not defined, and would thus include movable and immovable property. 
 9.  Ontario Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-1, § 1(1) (Can.) [hereinafter OSGA] 
(defining goods as “chattels personal, other than things in action,” which dictates the scope of 
application of implied obligations in consumer contracts); Ontario Consumer Protection Act, S.O. 
2002, c. 30, sched. A, §§ 9 (2) & (3) (Can.) [hereinafter OCPA]. Id. § 1 (showing a broader 
definition of goods as “any type of property” which would apply to other consumer protection 
obligations under the OCPA). See also British Columbia Sale of Goods Act, RSBC, 1996, c.410, 
§ 1(a) (Can.), [hereinafter BCSGA]; see also Alberta Sale of Goods Act RSA 2000, c. S-2, § 1(h) 
(Can.) [hereinafter ASGA]; Alberta Fair Trading Act, RSA 2000, c. F-2, § 1(1)(e) (Can.) 
[hereinafter AFTA]. Certain definitions refer to “tangible” personal property: Manitoba 
Consumer Protection Act, RSM 1987, C.C.S.M. c. C200, § 1(1) (Can.) [hereinafter MCPA]; New 
Brunswick Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, SNB 1978, c. C-18.1, § 1(1) (Can.) 
[hereinafter NBCPWLA]. In the European Union, European Community, Parliament and Council 
Directive 1999/44/EC of May 25, 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees [1999] O.J. L 171/07 at 12 [hereinafter Directive 1999/44/EC] art. 1(2)(b) 
(defining goods as any “tangible movable item,” with some limited exceptions). In the United 
States, the Uniform Commercial Code, Official Text (2000) (amended 2003) [hereinafter U.S. 
UCC], § 2-105(1) defines goods as “all things . . . which are movable at the time of identification 
to a contract for sale,” and includes “specially manufactured goods,” but excludes information 
and “things in action.” Sale of Goods Act 1979, c. 54, § 14(2)(d), § 61 (U.K.) [hereinafter 
UKSGA] (defining “goods” as including all “personal chattels, other than things in action and 
money”). 
 10.  I.e., the application of statutory implied obligations of quality and of fitness for 
purpose, of correspondence with description, of title, quiet possession and freedom from 
encumbrances. This requirement originates from the strong underpinnings of sale of good laws 
for these particular consumer protection obligations (i.e., consumer-protection-law-implied 
obligations typically expressly build upon or refer to sale of goods law in the field of consumer 
implied obligations). E.g., OCPA, supra note 9, §§ 9(2), 9(3). Section 9(3) refers to the existing 
implied obligations of the OSGA, and adds additional protection for consumer agreements: “Any 
term or acknowledgement, whether part of the consumer agreement or not, that purports to negate 
or vary any implied condition or warranty under the Sale of Goods Act or any deemed condition 
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common law implied obligations, the breach of which may be more 
difficult to establish than under their statutory counterparts.11 Implied 
obligations, applied within the framework of consumer protection law, 
can be invoked more easily, give rise to a broad range of remedies, and 
are often mandatory.12 In some cases, copies made accessible online may 
benefit from the protection of implied obligations as they apply to 
services.13  
Is the requirement of a physical object to qualify information products 
                                                                                                                     
or warranty under this Act is void.” In the United Kingdom, the UKSGA provides implied 
obligations for sale of “goods.” UKSGA, supra note 9, §§ 2, 12–14 and Services Act 1982, 1982, 
c. 29, §§ 1(1) & (2) (U.K.) [hereinafter UKSGSA] (providing implied obligations in “contracts 
for the transfer of goods” such as the supply of labor and materials and hire contracts). Id. §§ 2(1) 
& (2), 6(1)–(3), 11N(2)(b)). The Directive 1999/44/EC, applies to “goods.” Directive 199/44/EC, 
supra note 9, art. 1(2)(b), 2 (1)). The U.S. UCC, sections 2-312, 2-314, and 2-315 also apply to 
transactions in “goods.” U.S. UCC, supra note 9, §§ 2-312, 2-314, 2-315. 
 11.  St. Albans, Sir Iain Glidewell in obiter, stated that an implied obligation would apply 
at common law to computer software supplied under contract, citing Trollope & Colls, Ltd. v. 
N.W. Metro. Reg’l Hosp. Bd., (1973) 1 WLR 601, at 609:  
An unexpressed term can be implied if and only if the court finds that the parties 
must have intended that term to form part of their contract; it is not enough for 
the court to find that such a term would have been adopted by the parties as 
reasonable men if it had been suggested to them; it must have been a term that 
went without saying, a term which, though tacit, formed part of the contract 
which the parties made for themselves. 
Sir Iain Glidewell then concluded on that basis that “In the absence of any express term as to 
quality or fitness for purpose, or of any term to the contrary, such a contract is subject to an implied 
term that the program will be reasonably fit for, i.e. reasonably capable of achieving the intended 
purpose.” The court applied this passage of Sir Iain Glidewell’s obiter in Horace Holman Group, 
Ltd. v. Sherwood Int’l Group, Ltd., 2000 WL 491372 (TCC). 
 12.  For example in Canada, see OCPA, supra note 9, § 9(3); see also QCPA, supra note 8, 
§§ 261, 262; Saskatchewan Consumer Protection and Business Practices Act, c. C-30.2 of the 
Statutes of Saskatchewan, 2013, 5.15(1) [hereinafter SCPBA]; NBCPWLA, supra note 9, § 24. 
However in limited circumstances, it can be limited by contract, unless “it would not be fair or 
reasonable to allow reliance on such agreement.” Id. § 25. BCSGA, supra note 9, §§ 18, 20; Nova 
Scotia Consumer Protection Act, RSNS 1989, c. 92, 26 (3) (d) & (f) [hereinafter NSCPA]; MCPA, 
supra note 9, § 58(1). ROBERT BRADGATE, CONSUMER RIGHTS IN DIGITAL PRODUCTS 20 (2010) 
(referring to three main characteristics of implied obligations under §§ 12 to 15 of UKSGA: “(a) 
they are easy to prove; (b) their breach allows the consumer buyer to seek to bring into play a 
range of powerful remedies; and (c) neither they nor liability for their breach can be excluded 
where the buyer ‘deals as consumer.’”). See also id. at 26, 49. 
 13.  This would then give rise to different regimes of protection. In the case of services, for 
example under the OCPA, supra note 9, § 9(1) the implied warranty applicable to services is that 
the services are of a “reasonably acceptable quality.” See also MCPA, supra note 9, § 58(6) 
(providing a non-mandatory implied warranty, “that the services sold shall be provided in a 
satisfactory manner”); UKSGSA, supra note 10, § 14(2) (providing that “there is an implied term 
that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality.”). See also BRADGATE, supra 
note 12, at 28–29. 
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as goods falling under the protection of statutory sale of goods and 
consumer laws a relevant criterion and if so, under what rationale? The 
requirement that an information product must have a physical 
embodiment or aspect to be considered a good was stated in the English 
Court of Appeal judgment St. Albans City & District Council v. 
International Computers, Ltd.14 Sir Iain Glidewell, in a frequently cited 
obiter dictum, stated that the presence or not of a physical medium to 
supply the copy of the computer software would be the decisive factor to 
determine whether a computer program qualified as a good or not.15 
Canadian and American courts have also been more readily inclined to 
find that copies of information products are goods in presence of the 
supply of a hand-to-hand physical object.16 Sir Iain Glidewell made the 
distinction between the transfer of a computer disc for money, which 
would trigger the application of warranties under the applicable sale of 
goods law as the allegedly defective instructions (e.g., the code in the 
computer program) were part of the disc, and would have made the disc 
(i.e., a good) defective.17 However, in this case, the mere provision of a 
computer program would not, even though a disc was involved in the 
arrangement, have triggered the application of sale of goods warranties 
because the installer had transferred the program himself onto the 
computer but had retained the disc:  
                                                                                                                     
 14.  St. Albans City & Dist. Council v. Int’l Computers, Ltd., [1996] EWCA (Civ.) 1296 
(Eng.). 
 15.  Id. In that case, it was held that the defendant was under an express contractual 
obligation to provide the plaintiffs with software that would allow them to accomplish certain 
functions. Id. It was therefore not necessary to consider the legal ground (e.g., statutory or 
common law) under which implied obligations would apply. Lord Justice Nourse indicated 
concurrence with the obiter dictum. Id. This obiter dictum was cited in subsequent judgments: 
1996 SLT 604 (Outer House) [Beta Computers]. 
 16.  Courts tend to approach contracts for the supply of computer hardware and computer 
software as a whole as sale of goods. See BARRY B. SOOKMAN, COMPUTER, INTERNET, AND 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW, loose-leaf ¶ 2.17 (b) (1988). In Arvic Search Services, Inc. v. Foam 
Shop, Ltd., 2008 ABPC 256, the court, in obiter dictum, stated that softwares did not constitute 
goods. In that case, the issue of the application of implied obligations under the Alberta Sale of 
Goods Act, did not need to be addressed as the issue to be tried revolved around the consequences 
of non-performance of the contract by both parties. Id. In the United States, courts have been 
willing to consider software alone as involving a transaction in goods. See, e.g., Schroeders v. 
Hogan, 137 Misc. 2d 738, 742 (N.Y. Cty. Sup. Ct. 1987) ¶ 3 (holding that the U.S. UCC, as 
adopted in the State of New York, applied to software licenses even if no hardware was being 
transferred); see also Shema Kolainu-Hear Our Voices v. Providersoft, 2010 WL 2075921 
(E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2010) (referring to case law supporting treatment of software license as a good 
under the U.S. UCC and noting uncertainty in the area). In that case, the parties had agreed to 
treat the software license agreement as “goods.” Id. at 199; see also Gross v. Symantec Corp., No. 
1200154 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012), at 9 (holding that a software delivered online with no physical 
supporting medium qualified as goods under the California UCC).  
 17.  Int’l Computers, Ltd., [1996] EWCA (Civ.) 1296 (Eng.); see also Southwark LBC v. 
IBM UK, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (TCC) 653 (Eng.). 
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As I have already said, the program itself is not “goods” within the 
statutory definition. Thus a transfer of the program in the way I 
have described does not, in my view, constitute a transfer of goods. 
It follows that in such circumstances there is no statutory 
implication of terms as to quality or fitness for purpose.18  
The lower Court in that case had stated, also in obiter dictum, that 
software were probably goods.19 The characterization that computer 
software without a physical supporting medium are not goods, as per the 
obiter by Sir Iain Glidewell, was applied or accepted in subsequent 
judgments.20  
The determinacy of a physical object to qualify software as a good is 
at first blush somewhat surprising. For software and other information 
products, the physical medium (i.e., the disc, DVD, book cover and 
paper) in which they are embedded has never been a defining component. 
It is the literary, functional, and artistic quality that they contain that 
distinguishes them from other products. In a judgment preceding St 
Albans, Beta Computers (Europe), Ltd v. Adobe Systems (Europe), Ltd,21 
Lord Penrose acknowledged the arbitrariness of giving prevalence to the 
supporting medium as the determining factor to qualify the object of the 
transaction as goods: 
It appears to emphasize the role of the physical medium, and to 
relate the transaction in the medium to sale or hire of goods. It 
would have the somewhat odd result that the dominant 
characteristic of the complex product, in terms of value or of the 
significant interests of parties, would be subordinated to the 
medium by which it was transmitted to the user in analyzing the 
                                                                                                                     
 18.  Int’l Computers, Ltd., [1996] EWCA (Civ.) 1296 at 266. 
 19.  St. Albans City & Dist. Council v. Int’l Computers, Ltd., [1995] FSR 686 (QB) 699 
(Eng.): 
I am of the view that software probably is goods within the Act. Programs are, 
as has been pointed out, of necessity contained in some physical medium, 
otherwise they are useless. As Mr Mawrey put it, it is just as much a supply of 
goods as if paint were applied to a wall or printing ink to a blank page. It is not 
simply abstract information like information passed by word of mouth. Entering 
software alters the contents of the hardware. 
 20.  See Horace Holman Grp., Ltd. v. Sherwood Int’l Grp., Ltd., [2001] All E.R. 83 (Eng.); 
see also Southwark LBC v. IBM U.K., Ltd., [2011] EWHC (TCC) 653 (Eng.) ¶ 96ff, where in an 
obiter dictum Akenhead J. stated that software could constitute goods under UKSGA, but in the 
context of the transfer of a supporting physical medium such as a CD. See Your Response, Ltd. 
v. Datateam Bus. Media, Ltd., [2014] EWCA (Civ.) 281 (Eng.); Fern Computer Consultancy, Ltd. 
v. Intergraph Cadworx & Analysis Solutions, Inc., [2014] EWHC (Ch) 2908 (Eng.). 
 21.  Beta Computers (Europe), Ltd. v. Adobe Sys. (Europe), [1996] S.L.T. 604, 608 (Eng.). 
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true nature and effect of the contract. If one obtained computer 
programs by telephone, they might be introduced into one’s own 
hardware and used as effectively as if the medium were a disk or 
CD or magnetic tape.22  
Commentators also note the oddity of the requirement that software 
be embedded in a physical object to qualify them as goods.23 Yet, the 
Court in Beta Computers refused to treat the supply of computer software 
as the sale of goods.24 In a recent judgment by the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales, the lack of physical embodiment was a determinant 
factor to qualify a database as intangible property and in holding that it 
could not be subject to a common law possessory lien.25 
Directive 2011/83/EU places a similar emphasis to that of Sir Iain 
Glidewell in St. Albans on the presence of a supporting physical medium 
exchanged from hand-to-hand, to determine whether copies of 
information products (“digital content”) qualify as a good or not.26 
Directive 2011/83/EU harmonizes the laws of Member States with 
respect to traders’ information disclosure requirements in consumer 
contracts, including distance or off-premises contracts, as well as with 
respect to formal requirements for these specific types of contracts.27 On 
the one hand, copies of information products that are supported by a 
physical medium exchanged from hand-to-hand are “goods.”28 On the 
other hand, copies distributed online with no physical supporting media 
exchanged from hand-to-hand are neither goods nor services, but of a sui 
                                                                                                                     
 22.  Id. at 608–09. 
 23.  On the triviality of the physical medium in comparison to the computer programming, 
see also Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Computer Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code: Taking a Byte out of the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REV. 129, 131–33 (1985). The 
confusion that arises from the presence of intellectual property rights and other intangibles and 
the physical medium supporting it was noted by Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853, 861–62 (1986). The artificiality 
of this distinction in an increasing world of online distribution of copyright works (and generally 
information products) is also discussed by P.S. ATIYAH & JOHN N. ADAMS, THE SALE OF GOODS 
68–71 (10th ed. 2001). The authors come to this conclusion by a consequential argument, as to 
whether liability for a defective software should be different based on how the software is 
delivered (i.e., a disc or online (answering this question in the negative)). 
 24.  Lord Penrose qualified the software license agreement as a sui generis contract. Beta 
Computers, [1996] S.L.T. 604 (Eng.), at 608. 
 25.  Your Response, Ltd., [2014] EWCA (Civ.) 281 (Eng.) ¶¶ 20–21. 
 26.  E.C., Council and Parliament Directive 2011/83/EU of 22 November 2011 on 
Consumer Rights, Amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and 
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, O.J. L 304/64, pmbl. Recital 
19 [2011] [hereinafter Directive 2011/83/EU]; see St. Albans City & Dist. Council v. Int’l 
Computers, Ltd., [1996] EWCA (Civ.) 1296 (Eng.). 
 27.  Directive 2011/83/EU, supra note 26, pmbl., Recitals 1–2. 
 28.  Id. pmbl., Recital 19. 
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generis nature.29 The Green Paper on the Consumer Acquis30 invited 
Member States to consider the expansion of the European Union regime 
of consumer sale of goods to the supply of digital content.31 This proposal 
met fierce resistance,32 with the result that the proposal for reform did not 
expand the application of the European consumer sales legal framework 
to the supply online of digital content.33 The foundations and rationale 
behind the insistence on the presence of a physical supporting medium 
exchanged from hand-to-hand for information products to qualify as 
“goods” in E.U. regulation are not entirely clear and merit further 
investigation.34 
It is somewhat surprising that the presence of a physical tangible 
product would be a defining attribute of information products, as the 
physical embodiment is the ancillary part of the product (such as the CD 
of a musical recording or the DVD of a film).35 As acknowledged by Lord 
Penrose in Beta Computers,36 the presence or not of a hand-to-hand 
physical supporting medium (e.g., a disc) with the copy of an information 
product (e.g., a software) as a determinant factor of its nature as good is 
somewhat artificial.37  
The peculiarity of the requirement of a physical object for information 
products to qualify as goods is even more apparent when contrasted to 
how other areas of law deal with the immateriality of copies of 
information products. For instance, international classifications (e.g., in 
the area of trademarks), classify software as goods regardless of the 
presence of a supporting tangible medium.38 In the United States, the 
                                                                                                                     
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Commission: Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, at 3, 2007 O.J. (C 
61/1). 
 31.  Id.  
32.   See Peter Rott, Download of Copyright-Protected Internet Content and the Role of 
(Consumer) Contract Law, 31 J. CONSUM. POL’Y 441, 452 (2008) (explaining the resistance 
especially with respect to the distribution of online software).  
 33.  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer 
Rights, at 2, COM (2008) 614 final (2008) (defining “goods,” leaves unchanged the definition of 
“consumer goods” in Directive 1999/44/EC).  
 34.  See discussion infra Parts III & IV. 
 35.  See BRADGATE, supra note 12, at 40–41 (analogizing such reasoning to placing more 
emphasis on the packaging than the substance of the product as the test of its qualification, such 
as focusing on the bottle of whiskey to determine the nature of whiskey.). 
 36.  Beta Computers (Eur.), Ltd. v. Adobe Sys. (Eur.), [1996] S.L.T. 604, 606 (Eng.). 
 37.  Id.  
38. NICE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS AND 
SERVICES FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE REGISTRATION OF MARKS, June 15, 1957, as amended, online, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/classification/nice/trtdocs_wo019.html. There are 45 
registration classes, 34 for goods and 11 for services. Class nine (goods) would cover software. 
The explanatory notes to Class nine states that this class includes: “all computer programs and 
software regardless of recording media or means of dissemination, that is, software recorded on 
magnetic media or downloaded from a remote computer network.” See also INTERNATIONAL 
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Copyright Act defines “copy” as: “material objects . . . from which the 
work can be perceived . . . either directly or with the aid of a machine 
. . . .”39 If “copy” was defined narrowly (i.e., as requiring the form of a 
material object (book, CD, DVD)), innumerable unauthorized copies 
would not be deemed to infringe copyright. Pointing to the U.S. 
Copyright Act definition of “copy” as including “immaterial” machine-
readable copies,40 Jean Braucher notes the incongruity that results from 
not also treating copies of software as goods under sale of goods law: 
“There is no good reason not to extend this version of tangibility, 
assuming tangibility is necessary, to the realm of Article 2.”41 “Software 
copies are perceivable by a machine and in that sense tangible, making 
them easily ‘things,’ which may not require tangibility.”42 
Other features of copies of information products may be more relevant 
to determine whether they are goods under relevant laws than the 
presence of a physical object. 
The tangible versus intangible property distinction is also relevant to 
distinguish goods from services, through the ordinary meaning of the two 
terms.43 In contrast with “goods,” “services” are rarely defined and when 
they are, not in a manner that elucidates their nature and scope.44 
                                                                                                                     
CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS AND SERVICES UNDER THE NICE AGREEMENT, 10th ed. online, available 
at http://www.wipo.int/classifications/nivilo/nice/index.htm?lang=en#. The trademark 
classification system fulfills different purposes (i.e., it allows trademark applicants to define for 
which types of goods and services they (intend to) use their trademark and claim exclusive rights). 
In Canada, “software” falls under the classification of wares and/or of services for the purpose of 
trademarks registration. Canadian Intellectual Property Office, “The Wares and Services 
Manual,” online, available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/wrs/dsplyPblc Srch.do. 
 39.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (1978). 
 40.  Jean Braucher, Contracting out of Article 2 Using a “License” Label: a Strategy that 
Should not Work for Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 268 (2007). 
 41.  E.g., U.S. UCC, supra note 9 (defining goods as “all things that are movable at the time 
of identification to a contract for sale,” including “manufactured goods,” but excluding 
information and “choses in action.”). 
 42.  Braucher, supra note 40, at 268. 
 43.  See Fiona Smith & Lorna Woods, A Distinction Without a Difference: Exploring the 
Boundary Between Goods and Services in the World Trade Organization and the European 
Union, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 60 (2005) (discussing by the authors, the distinction between 
tangible and intangible as dictated in part by the ordinary dictionary meaning attributed to “goods” 
and “services,” which is the approach chosen by the authors in the context of assessing the 
meaning of goods and services in an international trade context, e.g., at the World Trade 
Organization level). 
 44.  See, e.g., In the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, SBC, Official Text 
(2004) available at http://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/ID/freeside/04002_00 [hereinafter 
B.C. Law] (defining services as “services, whether or not the services are together with or separate 
from goods, and includes a membership in a club or organization.”); see also AFTA, supra note 
9, at 10 (defining services as “any service offered or provided primarily for personal, family or 
household purposes” and includes specific examples.); SCPBPA, supra note 12, § 2(h) defines 
“services” as “services ordinarily provided for personal, family, or household purposes that have 
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Generally though, goods are more readily associated with tangibility, and 
services with intangibility. As services are typically involved in the 
online delivery of information products, there is a tendency to qualify the 
transaction as one involving services only, forgetting that the transfer of 
an information product to the recipient may also be involved.45  
Traditionally, the Statute of Frauds’ requiring that certain contracts be 
in writing to be enforceable, applied only to the sale of goods and not to 
the provision of services.46 This has, at times, led courts to make artificial 
distinctions between “goods” and “services.”47 In some cases, uncertainty 
about the difference between goods and services stems from the 
confusion about the difference between the labor involved to deliver the 
commercialized end result and the end result itself.48 Such uncertainty 
                                                                                                                     
been or may be sold, leased or otherwise provided by a supplier to a consumer.”. 
 45.  In the absence of a hand to hand physical medium there remains confusion on the nature 
of digital content which can result in a qualification as a service. In Trib gr inst Nanterre, 6th 
Chamber, 15 Decembre 2006, Association UFC Que Choisir v Société Sony France, Société Sony 
United Kingdom, Ltd., online, available at http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3? 
id_article=1816. The supply of downloadable musical recordings through an Internet platform 
was qualified by the court as the supply of services under the French Code de la consommation. 
Directive 2011/83/EU, supra note 26, pmbl., Recital 19 (treating such copies of copyright works 
as neither goods or services). See Séverine Dusollier, Droit d’auteur et protection des oeuvres 
dans l’univers numérique 382, 395–96, 399 (2d ed. Bruxelles: Larcier, 2007) (holding that copies 
of information products downloaded from the internet cannot be the object of a sale but rather the 
provision of a service, conceding however that there is a product involved in the transaction but 
that the transmission of the product (the copy) characterizes the whole transaction as the provision 
of services). This is the case in the context of the World Trade Organization qualification of such 
products as goods or services. Tania Voon, A New Approach to Audiovisual Products in the WTO: 
Rebalancing Gatt and Gats, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1., 17–18 (2007) (proposing that in the 
context of the World Trade Organization agreements, such products should be treated as services). 
Braucher, supra note 40, at 269–70 (noting the artificiality of the distinction between a copy of 
software that is preloaded in a physical medium from one that is being downloaded).  
 46.  In a sale of goods context, Statute of Frauds impose that contracts for the sale of goods 
above a certain amount be in writing for contracts to be enforceable. For example, the Statute of 
Frauds requirements have been codified in the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code. U.S. UCC, supra 
note 9, § 2-201. This requirement was abolished in some provinces of Canada (e.g., British 
Columbia: Statute Law Amendment Act, SBC 1958, c. 52, § 17). This requirement was abolished 
in the United Kingdom by the repeal of section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act of 1893. Law Reform 
Enforcement of Contracts Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 11, c. 34, § 21.  
 47. See Robinson v. Graves, 1 K.B. 579 (Eng. 1935), available at http://www.vanuatu.usp. 
ac.fj/courses/LA313_Commercial_Law/Cases/Robinson_v_Graves.html (holding that the 
commissioning of a painting by oral agreement, the order of which was later annulled by the 
defendant, was a contract for skill and labor and not material). Therefore the statute of frauds rule 
by which contracts of a certain value needed to be in writing to be enforceable was not applicable. 
It is debatable that this was not a contract for materials. 
 48.  TK Power, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1058 (N.D.C.A. 2006) (where the 
court focused on what is the pre- dominant factor in a transaction involving both goods and 
services in determining whether the UCC applies to a transaction, which is whether the thrust is 
the rendition of service with goods incidentally involved or whether the transaction is a sale of 
goods with labor incidentally involved); Horovitz, supra note 23, at 132–33 (explaining the need 
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also flows from the combination of goods and services in the same 
transaction, in which case courts tend to apply an essential character of 
the transaction test49 or substantiality test50 to determine, on a case-by-
case basis, whether the commercial transaction is one for goods or 
services.51  
The distinction between goods and services affects the scope of 
protection available to purchasers in sale of goods and consumer law, the 
nature of claims52 and the applicable regime of liability. While 
information disclosure obligations and protection against unfair 
commercial practices typically apply equally to transactions of “goods” 
and “services,”53 this is not the case with respect to implied obligations 
(e.g., of quality, fitness for purpose, correspondence with description, 
title, and quiet possession). In several jurisdictions, the said implied 
obligations do not apply to services,54 leaving any applicable claims and 
                                                                                                                     
to make the distinction between the labor intensiveness of several information products and the 
end results. The distinction between services that are applied to perfect goods from other forms 
of services is a helpful distinction in that respect.); see Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v Dharma Sys., 
Inc., 148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998) (showing the need to draw the distinction between the two 
forms of labor in a contract involving the supply of customized computer software was made in 
the leading case); see also Propulsion Techs., Inc. v. Attwood Corp., 369 F.3d 896 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(characterizing the sale of unfinished propeller castings as goods in spite of the contract 
contemplating substantial services from supplier).  
 49.  Preload Co. of Can., Ltd. v. City of Regina, 20 D.L.R. (2d) 586, [1959] S.C.R. 801; 
Keillian W., Ltd. v. Sportspage Enter., Ltd. (1982), 23 Alta. L.R. (2d) 99, 40 A.R. 586 (Q.B.).  
 50.  See Advent Sys. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Colonial Life 
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.H. 1993); see also Synergistic 
Dahlmann v. Sulcus Hospitality Techs., Corp., 63 F. Supp. 2d 772 (E.D. Mich. 1999); see also 
ePresence, Inc. v. Evolve Software, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D. Mass. 2002); see also Heidtman 
Steel Prods., Inc. v Compuware Corp., F. Supp. 2d, 2000 WL 621144 (N.D. Ohio. 2000). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  For instance, if the transaction is characterized as one for services, a successful claim 
would lie in an actionable tort: for example negligent misrepresentation, or in breach of contract.  
 53.  When such jurisdictions explicitly provide such regimes of protection. For instance, 
this is the case under the OCPA. OCPA, supra note 9, sched. A; MCPA, supra note 9, § 58(1); 
AFTA, supra note 9, § 1(1)(e); SCPBPA, supra note 12, §§ 6–9. This is also the case of the 
European Union. Directive 2011/83/EU, supra note 26; Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 
1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, [1993] O.J. L 95/04 at 29 (seeking to approximate 
the laws of the European Union Member States with respect to non-negotiated contracts with 
consumers (art. 1)). This is also the case in France under the Code de la Consommation, and in 
the United Kingdom pursuant to Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulation 2000—SI 
2000/2334 and pursuant to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.  
 54.  This is the case under the QCPA, although the statutory warranty of correspondence 
with the description applies equally to goods and services. QCPA, supra note 8, art. 40. This is 
also the case under: MCPA, supra note 9, § 58(1); AFTA, supra note 9, § 1(1)(e); BCSGA, supra 
note 9, § 1(a); SCPBPA, supra note 12, § 44(1) (repealed 2014); NBCPWLA, supra note 9, § 
1(1); U.S. UCC, supra note 9 (applying only to goods); Directive 1999/44/EC, supra note 9 
(applying only to goods).  
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remedies against a defective service to the common law.55 In others, a 
different statutory implied obligation applies to services, requiring, for 
instance, that the services be deemed to be of a “reasonably acceptable 
quality.”56 Implied obligations applicable to goods impose a strict 
liability regime where consumers need to prove that goods are not 
meeting certain standards (e.g., of quality or fitness for use), while 
implied obligations applicable to services apply a fault-based regime 
where consumers must prove that the supplier was negligent in how the 
services were provided.57 It also affects the nature of remedies available58 
and involves evidentiary and statute of limitations considerations.59 
Whether information products qualify as goods or services engender 
other implications under different legal regimes including tax law and 
international trade law.60  
In an online environment, the absence of the hand-to-hand supply of 
a physical medium, compounded by the blurry line between “goods” and 
“services”61 are at the heart of the equivocalness that surrounds the 
                                                                                                                     
 55.  Trollope & Colls, Ltd v. N.W. Metro. Reg’l Hosp. Bd., 1 W.L.R. 601, 609 (1973). 
An unexpressed term can be implied if and only if the court finds that the parties 
must have intended that term to form part of their contract; it is not enough for 
the court to find that such a term would have been adopted by the parties as 
reasonable men if it had been suggested to them; it must have been a term that 
went without saying, a term which, though tacit, formed part of the contract 
which the parties made for themselves. 
Id. 
 56.  Statutory implied warranties adapted in the case of the provision of services have been 
introduced in some jurisdictions. For example under the OCPA, the implied warranty applicable 
to services is that the services are of a “reasonably acceptable quality.” OPCA, supra note 9, § 
9(1). See also MCPA, supra note 9, § 58(6) (providing a non-mandatory implied warranty, “that 
the services sold shall be provided in a satisfactory manner”); UKSGSA, supra note 10, s. 14(2)(d) 
(providing that “supplier will carry out the service with reasonable care and skill.”).  
 57.  See BRADGATE, supra note 12, at 28–29. In the case of services, for example under the 
OCPA, the implied warranty applicable to services is that the services are of a “reasonably 
acceptable quality.” OCPA, supra note 9. 
 58.  See LOOS ET AL., supra note 7, at 32 (analyzing the laws of 11 countries including the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other European states). 
 59.  Consumer protection laws tend to alleviate evidentiary requirements in favor of 
consumers. For example, the parole evidence rule often does not apply to consumer contracts. See 
generally Horovitz, supra note 23, at 140–43 (showing a U.S. context).  
 60.  See, e.g., Catherine L. Mann, Balancing Issues and Overlapping Jurisdictions in the 
Global Electronic Marketplace: The UCITA Example, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 225–26 
(2002); Christopher M. Bruner, Culture, Sovereignty, and Hollywood: UNESCO and the Future 
of Trade in Cultural Products, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 351 (2008). 
 61.  For a review of Canadian case law characterizing contracts as sale of goods or service 
agreements, or a combination of both (i.e., for “work and material”), see GERALD H.L. FRIDMAN, 
SALE OF GOODS IN CANADA (5th ed. 2004). See also JACOB S. ZIEGEL & ANTHONY J. DUGGAN, 
COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER SALES TRANSACTIONS, CASES, TEXT AND MATERIALS 49–61 (4th 
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characterization of information products.  
B. Rippling Effects on Sales and Licenses 
The presence of a physical object influences the qualification of the 
commercial transaction of information products; specifically, whether a 
sale or a license took place. The absence of an embedding medium (e.g., 
a CD or a DVD) facilitates a growing commercial practice under which 
copyright holders dictate through their contract terms the absence of sale 
in the copy of the information product, a practice that is far less common 
in the physical hand-to-hand exchange scenarios of books, music CDs, or 
film DVDs, which have long been considered as sales of goods.62 At 
times, courts confuse the license granted to consumers to the exclusive 
intangible intellectual property rights of the copyright holder, and the 
transaction that is taking place with respect to the copy itself.63 One can 
surmise that the confusion between the intellectual property rights of the 
copyright holder and the personal property rights to the copy of the 
information product will only grow bigger when there is no physical 
object separating the two.64 The struggles examined so far to characterize 
information products as goods, services, or sui generis extends to the 
determination of whether the transaction is a sale or a license, leading to 
inconsistent outcomes.65  
Permuting a sale by a license of the copy of the information product 
has important consequences on the rights of recipients of information 
products. First, the absence of a “sale” will preclude the application of 
sale of goods and consumer protection law statutes to apply in some 
                                                                                                                     
ed. 2002). For the European Union and World Trade Organization context, see Smith & Woods, 
supra note 43, at 40ff. In the context of the World Trade Organization, the treatment of digital 
products distributed online has not been settled and is the object of a work program on electronic 
commerce. Electronic Commerce, World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/ecom_e/ecom_e.htm. See also Tania Voon, A New Approach to Audiovisual Products in 
the WTO: Rebalancing Gatt and Gats, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2007). The uncertainty of 
the proper treatment of these products as goods or services needs to be understood within the 
economic, political and legal context proper to the World Trade Organization treatment of goods 
and services. Id.  
 62.  The transfer of CDs, DVDs, and cassettes are commonly treated as sales of chattels 
movables, unless they are provided under a specific rental agreement. By contrast, the software 
industry has for some time adopted the commercial practice to license (and not sell) copies of 
software even when they were supplied through the physical transfer of a CD or DVD. Step-Saver 
Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing briefly the historical 
context of software licenses). 
 63.  See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 64.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 65.  See discussion supra Part II.A. For a review of the case law and how courts tend to be 
more lenient to enforce license to software copies than copies of other types of copyright works, 
see Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 1235–38. 
80 JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 20 
 
jurisdictions, leaving any protection to the potential application of other 
statutes or to the application of similar implied obligations under the 
common law.66 Second, licensing copies of information products rather 
than selling them to recipients enables copyright holders to circumvent 
the application of exceptions to copyright infringement, the rationale for 
such licensing practices being well known and documented.67 Whether 
an information product is sold or licensed determines recipients’ ability 
to perform certain acts without the authorization of copyright holders 
such as: benefiting from the first sale doctrine68 or the computer programs 
exemptions.69 Recipients of information products are authorized to 
perform those acts without copyright holders’ authorization on copies 
that that they own, not when the copies of information products are 
licensed. 
Courts have taken different approaches to decide whether a sale or a 
license of the information product took place, in the context of 
determining whether the recipient of the information product would 
benefit from the relevant exception to copyright infringement (i.e., those 
exceptions requiring that a sale or transfer of the copy of the information 
product take place to apply). The approaches vary between deferring in 
large part to how copyright holders characterize the transaction (i.e., it is 
a license because right holder stated it as such in the agreement) to 
looking at the substance and economic characteristics of the transaction, 
regardless of how the transaction is designated by the right holder.70 In 
the United States, the leading decision is the Ninth Circuit Court of 
                                                                                                                     
 66.  In some jurisdictions, the requirement of the sale of a good is relevant to the application 
of implied obligations (e.g., quality, fitness for purpose, title and quiet possession). It is generally 
not relevant for the application of information disclosure requirements and for the application of 
provisions prohibiting unfair terms. See supra Part II.A. In the United Kingdom, while the implied 
obligations under the UKSGA (supra note 9) would not apply in the absence of a sale, the implied 
obligations of the UKSGSA. UKSGSA, supra note 10, c. 29 (showing it may apply if the 
transaction falls within the scope of this Act). See, e.g., SAM Bus. Sys., Ltd. v. Hedley & Co., 
[2002] EWHC 2733 (TCC) (Eng.); Jonathan Wren & Co., Ltd. v. Microdec PLC, 1999 WL 
1953326 (1999) (Eng.) (holding UKSGSA applied to computer systems). 
 67.  The practice is well-recognized and particularly prevailing with respect to copies of 
computer programs. See Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements do not Control Copy 
Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887 (2010); Perzanowski 
& Schultz, supra note 2, at 1242–46. 
 68.  See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 69.  See, e.g., Canada’s Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, §§ 30.6, 30.61 [hereinafter 
CCA]; 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1). In the European Union, exceptions to copyright infringement 
applicable to computer programs are governed by the European Council. Council and Parliament 
Directive 2009/24/EC of 23 April 2009 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, [2009] 
O.J. L 111/16 [hereinafter Directive 2009/24/EC].  
 70.  See Carver, supra note 67, at 1898–923.On a case law analysis of how courts take 
different approaches to determine the nature of the legal transaction as sale or license in cases 
involving software versus other cases, see Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 1925-31. 
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Appeals judgment Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.,71 reflecting the first 
approach. In that judgment, the court gave more weight to the terms used 
by software licensor than in previous judgments that focused more on the 
substance of the transaction.72 The court held that the applicable test to 
determine the nature of the transaction was: “whether the copyright 
owner specifies that a user is granted a license. Second, we consider 
whether the copyright owner significantly restricts the user’s ability to 
transfer the software. Finally, we consider whether the copyright owner 
imposes notable use restrictions.”73 In the European Union, the judgment 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle 
International Corp,74 is illustrative of the second approach, focusing on 
the substance of the transaction. In that case, the court had to assess 
whether a sale of the software copies of Oracle International Corp to 
                                                                                                                     
 71.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 72.  A good illustration of how courts have qualified the transaction, regardless of suppliers 
labeling the contract as a license is Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 
1086 (C.D. Cal. 2001): 
[T]he following factors require a finding that distributing software under licenses 
transfers individual copy ownership: temporally unlimited possession, absence 
of time limits on copy possession, pricing and payment schemes that are unitary 
not serial, licenses under which subsequent transfer is neither prohibited nor 
conditioned on obtaining the licensor’s prior approval (only subject to a 
prohibition against rental and a requirement that any transfer be of the entity), 
and licenses under which the use restrictions’ principal purpose is to protect 
intangible copyrightable subject matter, and not to preserve property interests in 
individual program copies.  
The Court relied on the comments made by Professor Nimmer: 
Ownership of a copy should be determined based on the actual character, rather 
than the label, of the transaction by which the user obtained possession. Merely 
labeling a transaction as a lease or license does not control. If a transaction 
involves a single payment giving the buyer an unlimited period in which it has a 
right to possession, the transaction is a sale. In this situation, the buyer owns the 
copy regardless of the label the parties use for the contract. Course of dealing 
and trade usage may be relevant, since they establish the expectations and intent 
of the parties. The pertinent issue is whether, as in a lease, the user may be 
required to return the copy to the vendor after the expiration of a particular 
period. If not, the transaction conveyed not only possession, but also transferred 
ownership of the copy.  
Id. On the distinction between sales and licenses under U.S. copyright law, see also F.B.T. Prods. 
v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010). See also test to establish ownership in copies 
regarding rights of copy owners of computer programs to make limited modifications under 17 
U.S.C. § 117(a)(1); Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2005); ZilYen, Inc., v. Rubber 
Mfrs. Ass’n, 935 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 73.  Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110–11. 
 74.  Case C-128/11, Usedsoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. at 10. 
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UsedSoft had taken place to decide whether the exclusive distribution 
right of Oracle International Corp on the copies of his computer programs 
had been exhausted.75 The court noted that the download of the copy of 
the computer program combined with the conclusion of a user license 
constituted a whole for the purpose of their legal classification.76 The 
Court relied on two components of the commercial transaction to 
conclude that there was a transfer of ownership of the copy downloaded 
from the Internet: the payment of a one-time fee and the fact that the user 
was allowed to use the copy for an indefinite period of time.77 The court 
reasoned that “sale” needed to be given a broad interpretation and its 
presence assessed based on the substance of the transaction, otherwise 
suppliers could easily circumvent the principle of exhaustion.78  
The practice to license the copy of the information product rather than 
selling it begs the important questions: what rights does the recipient of 
the information product precisely have and what rights does the supplier 
retain in the copy? Where does the personal property in the copy lie in all 
this and does it make any sense?79 The practice of licensing and not 
selling the copy of an information product for an indefinite period of time, 
often in exchange for a one-time fee may be deceiving. Such licensing 
practices may easily create a false perception of ownership or quasi 
ownership, but for an important limitation: often, the recipient of the copy 
                                                                                                                     
 75.  Id. The court was seized with a reference to a preliminary ruling by the 
Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), that involved the question of whether exhaustion of the 
distribution right in article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24/EC, applied to a lawful acquirer who had 
made the copy by downloading the computer program from the Internet to a data carrier. Directive 
2009/24/EC, supra note 69, art. 4(2). 
 76.  Case C-128/11, ¶¶ 44–49. 
 77.  Id. ¶ 45.  
 78.  Id. ¶ 49, the court referring to the opinion of Advocate General Y. Bot:  
if the term “sale” within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24 were 
not given a broad interpretation as encompassing all forms of product marketing 
characterised by the grant of a right to use a copy of a computer program, for an 
unlimited period, in return for payment of a fee designed to enable the copyright 
holder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic value of the copy 
of the work of which he is the proprietor, the effectiveness of that provision 
would be undermined, since suppliers would merely have to call the contract a 
“license” rather than a “sale” in order to circumvent the rule of exhaustion and 
divest it of all scope. 
 79.  See Carver, supra note 67, at 1896–97 (pointing to the practice of suppliers licensing 
goods, retaining personal property ownership, but with a permanent transfer of possession as 
unprecedented and incoherent). Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds can do for Property 
Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 159, at 191–96 (2010) (questioning the increasing practice to license copies 
rather than selling them in the context of virtual worlds, noting that traditionally in property law, 
licenses have not been granting a possessory interest but have been used to grant a permission 
(e.g., to certain uses of reserved intellectual property rights, or to limited access to land)). 
2015] THE UNDUE RELIANCE ON PHYSICAL OBJECTS 83 
 
does not have the right to transfer it to a third party.80  
Questions on the nature and enforceability of the legal transaction in 
the commercialization of information products are not trivial: they 
determine the balance of power between supplier and recipient of the 
information product. The preferred methods of commercialization of 
information products raise questions that relate to the legitimacy of the 
progressive expansion of intellectual property rights in recent years.81 
They involve evaluating right holders’ commercial practices (often 
through non-negotiated standard-form agreements) in relation to the 
underlying objectives of copyright and the delicate balance that it needs 
to maintain among the competing interests of right holders, authors and 
users. For instance, should we allow right holders to circumvent 
exceptions to copyright infringement, also referred to as user rights, 
through their commercial practices, and if so, under what rationale and 
parameters?82 At a more basic level, the sale versus licensing of an 
information product determines whether the recipient owns the copy of 
the information product with all prima facie open-ended powers and 
privilege (including of transfer), that come with ownership, against the 
world (in rem), or if the recipient has a limited contractual right to use the 
information product (in personam) with no power of transfer, or if the 
recipient’s entitlements to the information products lie somewhere in the 
middle.  
C. First Sale or Exhaustion Doctrine 
The reluctance to apply the first sale doctrine to information products 
distributed online is another important manifestation of the dividing line 
that tangibility (or the lack thereof) creates in the regulation of 
                                                                                                                     
 80.  See Pascale Chapdelaine, The Ambiguous Nature of Copyright Users’ Rights, 26 
INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 26–28 (2013). At times suppliers of information products refer to words such 
as purchase and ownership concurrently with language suggesting that recipients do not own the 
copies that are made available to them.  
 81.  Copyright has not ceased expanding during the last century in duration, in subject 
matter, and in scope, in Canada, the United States and worldwide. In Canada, the latest 
amendments to the CCA came into force with the Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, 
to comply with Canada’s international obligations under the World Intellectual Property 
Organization Internet Treaties of 1996 [WIPO Internet Treaties]. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 
20, 1996, WO033EN, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html# 
P8_189 [hereinafter WCT]; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 
WO034EN, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html 
[hereinafter WPPT]. The main purpose of the treaties is to address “the profound impact of the 
development and convergence of information and communication technologies on the creation 
and use of literary and artistic works.” WCT, supra, pmbl. 
 82.  For a discussion on whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory, see 
Chapdelaine, supra note 80, at 37–43; see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE 
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 168–70 (2013). 
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information products. The exhaustion or first sale doctrine83 is the rule 
stipulating that once the first sale of physical objects embodying 
copyright works (such as a book, DVD, or a music CD) has occurred with 
the authorization of the copyright holder, the copyright holder cannot 
dictate the fate of subsequent transfers of that object.84 The first sale or 
exhaustion doctrine restricts copyright holders’ exclusive distribution 
rights and does not apply to other exclusive rights (e.g., the right to 
reproduce the work or to communicate the work to the public by 
telecommunication).85 In essence, the exhaustion or first sale doctrine 
allows owners of copies of information products to exercise one of the 
basic powers and privileges of ownership (i.e., to transfer their rights in 
the copies to another party). The first sale or exhaustion doctrine is one 
among other exceptions to copyright infringement wherein the presence 
of a physical object plays a determinant role on their applicability.86 
Only lawful owners of copies of information products can invoke the 
exhaustion or first sale doctrine; licensees, borrowers or people who 
otherwise access copies of information products cannot.87 The prevailing 
commercial practice to license copies of information products rather than 
sell copies outright allows copyright holders to avoid the application of 
the first sale or exhaustion doctrine and to retain control over secondary 
markets of the information products that they commercialize.88 
Therefore, the diverging approaches adopted by courts in determining 
whether a sale or license took place have important ramifications on the 
application of the first sale or exhaustion doctrine.89 
The prevailing view is that the exclusive right of distribution and its 
                                                                                                                     
 83.  The doctrine is known as the first sale doctrine in the United States and as the principle 
of exhaustion in other jurisdictions.  
 84.  At the copyright international law level, see WCT, supra note 81, art. 6; WPPT, supra 
note 81, art. 8. In Canada, the exclusive distribution right and its exhaustion were introduced in 
2012 by the Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 [hereinafter CMA], which amended 
the CCA, supra note 71, §§ 3, 15, 18. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (a); see also U.S. Copyright Office, A 
Report of the Register of Copyrights Pursuant to Section 104 of the DMCA, at 22–23 (2001), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_study.html [hereinafter 
DMCA 2001 Report]. 
 85.  DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 84, at 79–80. 
 86.  Other exceptions to copyright infringement require a sale or other transfer of the copy 
of the information product for the exception to apply (e.g., with respect to computer programs). 
See CCA, supra note 69, §§ 30.6, 30.61; 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1); Directive 2009/24/EC, supra note 
69. This requirement tends to favor information products embedded into physical objects over 
copies distributed online with no physical embedding medium. 
 87.  At the copyright international law level, see WCT, supra note 81, art. 6; WPPT, supra 
note 81, art. 8. In Canada, the exclusive distribution right and its exhaustion were introduced in 
2012 by the CMA. CMA, supra note 84 (amending the CCA, supra note 69, §§ 3, 15, 18). See 17 
U.S.C. § 109 (a); see also DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 84, at 22–23. 
 88.  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 89.  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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exhaustion only apply with respect to copyright works embedded in 
physical tangible objects and does not apply to digital copies of 
information products made available to recipients with no supporting 
physical medium exchanged from hand to hand. Article 6 of WCT and 
article 8 of WPPT impose on their member states the substantive minima 
to confer an exclusive distribution right to copyright holders for their 
literary and artistic works (or of their performances fixed in phonograms 
in the case of WPPT) (i.e., to authorize “the making available to the 
public of the original and copies of their works through sale or other 
transfer of ownership.”).90 They leave it up to member states to determine 
the application of exhaustion “after the first sale or other transfer of 
ownership of the original or a copy of the work with the authorization of 
the author.”91 The agreed statement concerning these articles specifies 
that the copies that are subject to the right of distribution refer exclusively 
to “fixed copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects.”92 On 
that basis, commentators argue that the effect of WCT and WPPT is to 
exclude the application of the exhaustion of the distribution right to 
digital copies of information products distributed online.93 The 
implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties or existing law of Member 
States, including Canada,94 the United States,95 and the European 
                                                                                                                     
 90.  WCT, supra note 81, art. 6; WPPT, supra note 81, art. 8. 
 91.  WCT, supra note 81, art. 6; WPPT, supra note 81, art. 8. 
 92.  WCT, supra note 81 (agreed statements concerning arts. 6 & 7).  
 93.  See André Lucas, International Exhaustion, in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT THREE HUNDRED 
YEARS SINCE THE STATUTE OF ANNE, FROM 1709 TO CYBERSPACE 304, 309ff (Lionel Bently et al. 
eds., 2010) [hereinafter GLOBAL COPYRIGHT]. The author argues that WCT, art. 6, read in 
conjunction with art. 8, closed the path to the application of an immaterial exhaustion principle. 
See also PIERRE-EMMANUEL MOYSE, LE DROIT DE DISTRIBUTION: ANALYSE HISTORIQUE ET 
COMPARATIVE EN DROIT D’AUTEUR 559–62 (Cowansville, Québec: Les Editions Yvon Blais 2007). 
 94.  CMA introduced the exclusive distribution right and the principle of exhaustion in the 
CCA. CCA sections 3, 15 & 18 refer to work (or other subject matter of copyright) “that is in the 
form of a tangible object.” CCA, supra note 69, §§ 3, 15, 18. 
 95.  See Marybeth Peters, The Legal Perspective on Exhaustion in the Borderless Era: 
Consideration of a Digital First Sale Doctrine for Online Transmissions of Digital Works in the 
United States, in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 93 (citing the DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 
84, at 80, 97); see also Capitol Records LLC v ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y., 
2013).  
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Union,96 tends to confirm that interpretation.97  
Two recent judgments, UsedSoft98 by the E.U. Court of Justice 
[UsedSoft], and Capitol Records LLC v ReDigi, Inc.,99 by the South 
District Court of New York, [ReDigi], have taken very different 
approaches in determining whether the first sale or exhaustion doctrine 
applied to information products distributed online. In UsedSoft, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union was faced with a preliminary ruling by 
the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) that involved the question of whether 
exhaustion of the distribution right in article 4(2) of Directive 
2009/24/EC applied to a lawful acquirer who had made the copy by 
downloading the computer program from the Internet to a data carrier.100 
The outcome of that question was of significant importance to Oracle 
who at the time distributed 85% of its computer programs through 
Internet downloads.101 Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24/EC provides: 
“The first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the 
rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within 
the Community of that copy . . .”102 The Court pointed to various possible 
interpretations of article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24/EC that revolved 
around the question of whether there was a need to put the computer 
                                                                                                                     
 96.  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society, [2001] O.J., L 167/10 [hereinafter Directive 2001/29/EC]. The conclusion is made from 
the application of art. 4.2 in conjunction with recitals 28 and 29, pmbl. See Lucas, supra note 93, 
in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 97, at 309ff; Tomasz Targosz, Exhaustion in Digital Products 
and the ‘Accidental’ Impact on the Balance of Interests in Copyright Law, in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, 
supra note 93, at 337; Séverine Dusollier, The Relations Between Copyright Law and Consumers’ 
Rights from a European Perspective, EUR. PARLIAMENT PUB., Nov. 10, 2010, at 26–27. But see 
European Union, Opinion Advocate General Bot, Case C-128/11, Axel W. Bierbach, 
administrator of UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp., 24 Apr. 2012, ¶¶ 75–76 (raising 
doubts as to whether Directive 2001/29/EC limits the distribution right and its exhaustion to 
copyright works embodied in physical objects). See also Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. 
Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. at 10 (holding that exhaustion applied to digital copies of 
computer programs are not embedded in a physical object). See Art & Allposters Int’l BV v. 
Stichting Pictoright, C.J.E.U. (2015) (interpreting the distribution right under Directive 
2001/29/EC ¶¶ 29–39). 
 97.  In particular, the implementation by the European Union goes one step further than the 
WCT and WPPT, in emphasizing the need for the transfer of a tangible object embedding the 
copyright work for the rule of exhaustion to apply. See Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 96. 
 98.  See Case C-128/11, Usedsoft, 2012 E.C.R. The Court had to determine whether the 
transfer of ownership (sale) of the copy of the computer program had taken place or not and is a 
requirement of the application of exhaustion. 
 99.  See Capitol Records LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 100.  See Case C-128/11, Usedsoft, 2012 E.C.R. ¶ 4. 
 101.  See id. ¶ 21. If copyright exhaustion did not apply to such copies, then Oracle would 
retain control on future transfers of the copies. If exhaustion applied, Oracle would lose control 
on the secondary markets of its computer programs. 
 102.  See id. ¶ 17. 
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program in circulation in a physical medium exchanged hand-to-hand for 
the exhaustion of distribution rights to apply.103 The Court found that the 
exhaustion of the distribution right in article 4(2) of Directive 
2009/24/EC applied regardless of whether the right holder put the copies 
of computer programs in circulation with a physical supporting medium 
exchanged hand-to-hand.104 The Court emphasized that for the doctrine 
of exhaustion to apply, the original acquirer reselling his copy of the 
computer software must make his own copy unusable; to allow otherwise 
would amount to an unauthorized reproduction, which the exhaustion 
doctrine would not cover.105 
The Court reiterated the lex specialis character of Directive 
2009/24/EC as regulating the protection of computer programs in relation 
to the broader framework of copyright protection in Directive 
2001/29/EC.106 For the time being, the holding of the UsedSoft judgment 
may not have ramifications beyond the specific case of computer 
programs distributed online. The Court neither sought to explain why 
there should be a different treatment for computer programs from that of 
other copyright works, nor did it have to decide whether the same 
conclusion could be made in respect of Directive 2001/29/EC under 
which the exhaustion doctrine is likely to require a sale of a physical 
embodiment to apply.107 The UsedSoft judgment leads to the odd result 
of a different application of the distribution right and exhaustion rule to 
computer programs than to other copyright works for no apparent reason. 
In ReDigi, Capitol Records, an established record label company, 
alleged that ReDigi’s platform and services, in particular its users’ resale 
of digital music files, amounted to copyright infringement.108 The 
relevant issues before the court were whether ReDigi’s resale services 
involved an unauthorized reproduction of digital music files, whether 
                                                                                                                     
 103.  Id. ¶ 32. The various interpretations are based on different applications of Article 4(2) 
of Directive 2009/24/EC and Directive 2001/29/EC. Directive 2009/24/EC, supra note 69; 
Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 96, recitals 28 & 29, pmbl.; id. art. 4 (being read in conjunction 
with Article 8 of WCT and the agreed statement concerning Articles 6 and 7 of WCT, the 
implementation of which forms part of the objectives of Directive 2001/29/EC). 
 104.  Case C-128/11, Usedsoft, 2012 E.C.R. ¶ 53ff. 
 105.  Id. ¶ 70. This is a corollary of the fact that the exhaustion doctrine only applies to the 
distribution right and not to other acts reserved to copyright holders. 
 106.  Id. ¶ 56. 
 107.  See id. ¶ 60 (stating that Directive 2009/24/EC could be interpreted independently from 
Directive 2001/29/EC, given the clear intent expressed by the European Union legislature in 
article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24/EC to apply to all copies of computer programs (tangible and 
intangible)). The Court did not explain the relationship and compliance of Directive 2009/24/EC 
with WCT, article 6 which has been interpreted as applying only to the distribution of copyright 
works involving the transfer of a tangible object. See Art & Allposters Int’l BV v. Stichting 
Pictoright, C.J.E.U. (2015) (interpreting the distribution right under Directive 2001/29/EC ¶¶ 29–
39). 
 108.  Capitol Records LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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there was an unauthorized distribution by Redigi of the music files and 
whether the first sale doctrine applied.109 The court held that the resale 
services involved unauthorized distributions and reproductions of music 
files and that the latter were not covered by the first sale doctrine which 
does not exhaust any other rights than the distribution right.110 Therefore, 
ReDigi infringed the copyright of Capitol Records.111 The court rejected 
ReDigi’s argument that at the end of each migration of the music files, 
the system ensured that there was only one copy of the relevant music 
files remaining.112 In doing so, and unlike the E.U. Court of Justice in 
UsedSoft, the Court applied the first sale doctrine restrictively and based 
on a literal meaning of the act of reproduction rather than taking a 
functional and purposive approach.113  
The different approaches taken in UsedSoft and ReDigi reflect other 
aspects of the tangible versus intangible property divide. While the 
technical approach by ReDigi is an attempt to replicate in the digital 
online world what occurs in the world of physical objects, UsedSoft’s 
approach reflects an adaptation to the online world that seeks to bridge 
the differences between the offline and online world, by looking at the 
function and purpose of the transaction at hand and of the first sale or 
exhaustion doctrine. 
The non-application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine to digital 
copies of information products distributed online reflects a copyright 
holder-centric view of copyright that favors its expansion at the expense 
of information product recipients’ rights.114 The non-application of 
                                                                                                                     
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. at 661. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 651. 
 113.  Id. at 650. “Simply put, it is the creation of a new material object and not an additional 
material object that defines the reproduction right.” The dictionary defines “reproduction” to 
mean, inter alia, “to produce again” or “to cause to exist again or anew.” See MERRIAM–WEBSTER 
COLLEGIATE EDITION 994 (10th ed. 1998) (emphasis added). Significantly, it is not defined as “to 
produce again while the original exists.” Thus, the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in 
. . . phonorecords” is implicated whenever a sound recording is fixed in a new material object, 
regardless of whether the sound recording remains fixed in the original material object.”  
 114.  Peters, as former U.S. Register of Copyrights at the U.S. Copyright Office (citing 
DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 84, at 82–83, 89):  
The Copyright Office recommendation was based on interrelated economic and 
practical considerations. One concern was the impact of a digital first sale 
doctrine on the ability of right holders to exploit their works. Works in digital 
format can be reproduced without any degradation in quality and transmitted 
rapidly with little cost. Thus digital transmissions, and the ease of pirating perfect 
copies, are likely to affect adversely the market for copies of a work to a greater 
degree than transfers of physical copies. 
GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 93, at 331; DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 84, at 100–01 
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digital exhaustion limits the scope of the first sale doctrine significantly 
in light of this increasingly prevalent method of distribution of copies of 
information products. The limited scope of application of the exhaustion 
or first sale doctrine raises the following questions: what is the rationale 
for why the exclusive distribution right requires a physical object be 
exchanged hand-to-hand so that exhaustion may apply, and is it 
justifiable?115 
D. Exclusive Copyright Acts Involved in the Commercialization of 
Information Products 
How we define information products and the commercial transactions 
involved have an impact on the exclusive rights of copyright holders as 
they make their works available online. Whether a consumer downloads 
an information product protected by copyright or streams it implicates 
varying rights of copyright holders.116 Does it involve a communication 
to the public, a distribution, or a reproduction of the work protected by 
copyright? Each separate reserved act performed without the 
authorization of copyright holders may constitute copyright 
infringement.117 Moreover, when collective management of copyright is 
involved, separate compensation mechanisms arise for the benefit of right 
holders. The determination of the reserved copyright act involved when 
information products are made available to recipients has important 
financial consequences for copyright holders, distributors of information 
products, other intermediaries, and ultimately the recipients 
                                                                                                                     
(considering briefly the reasonable expectations of consumers with respect to digital copies as an 
argument to support the application of the first sale doctrine to digital copies of copyright works 
distributed online but dismissed it expeditiously, giving way to the threat that its application would 
represent to the exclusive rights of copyright holders). 
 115.  See infra Part III. 
 116.  Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada, 
[2012] S.C.R 34 (Can.) ¶ 28, where the Supreme Court made the distinction between downloading 
and streaming as follows:  
Although a download and a stream are both “transmissions” in technical terms 
(they both use “data packet technology”), they are not both “communications” 
for purposes of the Copyright Act. This is clear from the Board’s definition of a 
stream as “a transmission of data that allows the user to listen or view the content 
at the time of transmission and that is not meant to be reproduced” (para 15). 
Unlike a download, the experience of a stream is much more akin to a broadcast 
or performance. 
The Court held that the online delivery of a permanent copy of a video game did not amount to a 
“communication” under CCA, s. 3(1)(f). Id. ¶ 43. 
 117.  Id. ¶ 41. 
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themselves.118  
Two recent judgments, one by the Supreme Court of Canada, the other 
UsedSoft, from E.U. Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), illustrate the link 
between the characterization of the information product and the 
commercial transaction taking place online while assessing the reserved 
copyright acts that are involved. In Entertainment Software 
Association,119 the Supreme Court of Canada had to decide whether 
downloading video games through the Internet amounts to a 
communication to the public via the musical works the games contain, 
thereby qualifying as the object of a separate tariff.120 In a five-to-four 
decision, the Court held that this act involved no act of communication 
to the public and could not trigger the application of a separate tariff.121 
Abella and Moldaver JJ. for the majority, defined the act of downloading 
copies of information products as follows:  
In our view, there is no practical difference between buying a 
durable copy of the work in a store, receiving a copy in the mail, 
or downloading an identical copy using the Internet. The Internet 
is simply a technological taxi that delivers a durable copy of the 
same work to the end user.122  
The treatment by the Court majority of various forms of copies of 
copyright works and methods of delivery as one and the same 
phenomenon with regard to infringement is pertinent in at least two 
respects. First, the court majority singled out the presence of an individual 
consumer copy of the information product, capable of delivery, and 
assimilated it to a copy embedded in a physical object. Second, the 
majority of the Supreme Court based its reasoning on the principle of 
technological neutrality, finding a functional equivalent between the 
online delivery of the copy of a computer program and the supply of a 
material medium.123 In doing so, the Court majority focused its attention 
on the essence and substance of the copy of an information product rather 
                                                                                                                     
 118.  For example, when copyright is administered by collectively, each reserved copyright 
act may be subject to a tariff or other compensation scheme. In Canada, the collective management 
of copyright is overseen by the Copyright Board which approves tariffs. CCA, supra note 69, §§ 
66–76. 
 119.  Entm’t Software Ass’n, [2012] S.C.R 34 (Can.) ¶ 28. 
 120.  Id. In that case, the tariff in question had been submitted by SOCAN to the Canadian 
Copyright Board for approval.  
 121.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 122.  Id.  
 123.  Id. ¶¶ 5–9. For a discussion on technological neutrality and the Entertainment Software 
Association judgment, see Carys J. Craig, Technological Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes 
of Copyright Law, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY, HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 271, 289–91 (Michael Geist ed., 2013).  
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than its form. 
In UsedSoft, the E.U. Court of Justice made an interesting observation 
on the co-existence of the distribution and the communication of a work 
to the public.124 The Court interpreted the transfer of ownership of a copy 
as transforming an act of communication to the public into a distribution 
under which, if the conditions were present, exhaustion would apply.125 
This is consistent with the Court’s determination of an online 
transmission as “the functional equivalent of the supply of a material 
medium.”126 The Court pointed to the essence of distribution (which 
typically involves the transfer of an original or copy of a copyright work) 
by contrast to a communication presented to the public (which involves 
a service, the consumption of which always necessitates the intervention 
of a third party). Both in UsedSoft (through the principle of functional 
equivalent) and Entertainment Software Association (through the 
principle of technological neutrality) the distribution act and the 
communication to the public act were viewed as mutually exclusive. 
While the Supreme Court rejection of the presence of the communication 
to the public in the online purchase of a video game may not hold in light 
of the subsequent entry into force of section 2.4 (1.1) of Canada’s 
Copyright Act,127 the Court’s majority treatment in Entertainment 
Software Association of online copies of copyright works distributed 
online remains relevant to the discussion on the (in)determinacy of 
physical objects in the regulation of information products.  
III. CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE REQUIREMENT OF A 
PHYSICAL OBJECT 
Let us take a closer look at some of the causes that may explain the 
current tangible and intangible property divide with respect to 
information products. The purpose of the exercise is to show why the 
emphasis on a physical object is largely unjustified and how it leads to 
inconsistent and arbitrary results. The first part of the analysis considers 
two noticeable trends of how courts, legislatures and commentators 
characterize information products that result from a misconception of the 
properties involved in information products. The second part of the 
analysis explores the role that prevailing commercial practices play in 
shaping the tangible and intangible property divide of information 
products, particularly through non-negotiated standard form agreements. 
                                                                                                                     
 124.  Case C-128/11, Usedsoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R ¶ 52. 
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Id. ¶ 61.  
127.   CMA, which amended CCA, by the introduction of s. 2.4 (1.1), entered into force Nov. 
7, 2012. 
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The third part of the analysis assesses the negative consequences of such 
trends to recipients’ rights to information products in terms of how these 
rights are degraded as well as the resulting double standards and 
consequent legal and normative incoherence. 
A. Misconceptions of Properties 
1. The Meaning of “Tangible Property” 
That the presence of a physical object determines whether an 
information product is a good or the doctrine of first sale applies reflects 
a misconception of the division between tangible and intangible property. 
In the case of information products made available online with no 
supporting physical objects, one could be tempted to conclude that they 
are intangible property by relying on the ordinary meaning of tangible 
(i.e., something “capable of being perceived especially by the sense of 
touch”).128 Some courts have stated that a physical object needed to be 
present for information products to qualify as goods.129 The qualification 
is important because intangible property (or choses in action) is often 
excluded from the application of sale of goods and consumer protection 
law.130 The contrast between tangible and intangible property is stark in 
many other areas of the law: the tort of conversion and the common law 
possessory lien have been held to apply solely with respect to tangible 
property (choses in possession).131 In an increasingly immaterial world, 
the function of the distinction between tangible and intangible property 
may have become lost in translation.132  
A closer look at how “tangible property” and “intangible property” 
have been traditionally defined at common law and the reason for the 
exclusion of intangible property under sale of goods law indicate that the 
lack of a physical object should not be a relevant criterion per se to 
exclude information products from being tangible property and goods by 
extension. By the same token, the lack of a physical object should not be 
                                                                                                                     
 128.  CANADIAN OXFORD DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.oxford 
reference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195418163.001.0001/m-en_ca-msdict-00001-0069617? 
rskey=OrCWPZ&result=1 (defining “tangible” as “perceptible by touch; having material form 
. . . .”). Tangible originates from the latin “tangere[,]” which means touch. Id. 
 129.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 130.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 131.  For the tort conversion, see OBG, Ltd. v. Allan, [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 A.C. 1 
(Eng.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldjudgmt/jd070502/ 
obg.pdf. For the common law lien, see Your Response, Ltd. v. Datateam Bus. Media, Ltd., [2014] 
EWCA (Civ.) 281 (Eng.) ¶ 34. 
 132.  See Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The (Ir)Relevance of 
(In)Tangibility, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 122 (2007) (discussing the false categories that arise 
from the tangible versus intangible property dichotomy); GREEN & RANDALL, supra note 4, at 131. 
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determinant to the application of the first sale or exhaustion doctrine in 
copyright law. Personal property (“chattels personal”) is subdivided 
between “choses in possession” and “choses in action.”  
Choses in possession are generally associated with “tangible 
property” (i.e., those, “unfixed movables perceptible by the senses and 
thus capable of actual physical possession,”133) or “corporeal things, 
tangible, movable and visible[;] they are always in the possession of 
someone.”134 In contrast, “choses in action” are generally associated with 
“intangible property” and are often negatively defined as “embracing all 
forms of property not involving actual possession or right of possession 
as a necessary incident . . . .”135 Choses in action include debt, liquidated 
damages, promissory notes, shares, and copyright.136 “Choses in action” 
originally referred to a tangible article which was in the possession of 
someone other than the owner: to recover it, the owner had to take an 
action at law, and later evolved to encompass “intangible rights existing 
only in contemplation of the mind, . . . all invisible and incorporeal 
rights.”137  
The key distinguishing factor between tangible and intangible 
property revolves around the ability to physically possess and exercise 
control over the resource with respect to tangible property (choses in 
possession). For intangible property (or choses in action) court 
intervention is generally necessary for the owner to exercise power and 
control over her resource. Courts have been reluctant to recognize that 
one could exercise physical possession over an information product that 
was not embedded in a physical object. In Your Response, Ltd. v 
Datateam Business Media, Ltd.,138 Moore-Bick LJ, for the Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales held that the claimant data manager was 
barred to exercise a common law lien over a database owned by the 
defendant for unpaid services, as the data manager did not have physical 
possession over the database.139 For the court, “possession is concerned 
with the physical control of tangible objects,” and although the data 
manager exercised “practical control” over the database, he could not 
exercise physical possession over information because it is intangible.140 
The evidence relating to the data manager’s actual and exercised physical 
                                                                                                                     
 133.  W.H. HASTINGS KELKE, AN EPITOME OF PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW 2 (3d ed. 1910). 
 134.  CROSSLEY VAINES, PERSONAL PROPERTY 11 (5th ed. 1973).  
 135.  KELKE, supra note 133, at 2. Vaines defines choses in action as “all rights and 
incorporeal things not being chattels real or choses in possession.” VAINES, supra note 134, at 11. 
 136.  KELKE, supra note 133, at 5–6. 
 137.  FRANK HALL CHILDS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 54 (1914). 
 138.  Your Response, Ltd., [2014] EWCA (Civ.) 281, ¶¶ 22–23, (Eng.). Davis L.J. & Floyd 
L.J. concurred with Moore-Bick L.J.’s judgment. Id. ¶¶ 37, 41. 
 139.  Id. ¶¶ 22–23. 
 140.  Id. 
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control of the database did not satisfy the court.141 Unfortunately, the 
court of appeal missed an opportunity to take a functional and 
technologically neutral approach to new shapes of property interests like 
the one in the case at hand (an online database). In general, with respect 
to information products delivered online, the fact that recipients are able 
to access their copy on a permanent basis and to store it on devices that 
they own or have restricted control over should satisfy the requirement of 
physical possession, just as it is satisfied with copies of audio CDs, film 
DVDs, or paper books.142 The movability and control over access to the 
copy of the information product at the exclusion of others are important 
attributes of physical control and possession.143 
Tangible property (choses in possession) in contrast with intangible 
property (choses in action) is perhaps best understood as things that are 
physical or concrete versus those that are conceptual or abstract. As one 
is capable of physically possessing the copy of an information product 
downloaded to a computer (e.g., a musical recording, e-book, film), the 
copy is not conceptual but is indeed concrete and physical.144 Such a copy 
therefore better fits the definition of tangible property (choses in 
possession) than intangible property (choses in action). 
The exclusion of intangible property from sale of goods law is 
comprehensible when looking at its purpose and scope, which is to 
regulate the trade between sellers and buyers, dealing with such concerns 
as methods of delivery and acceptance, perishable goods, implied 
warranties of quality, fitness for purpose, title and quiet possession.145 
Many of these considerations are largely irrelevant to choses in action as 
debts, liquidated damages, promissory notes, and copyright. By contrast, 
the preoccupations addressed in sale of goods law are highly relevant to 
copies of information products downloaded from the Internet. When was 
the information product delivered and accepted by the recipient? What 
implied warranties are attached to the information product? What are the 
remedies available to the recipient should there be a breach of contract? 
The rationale for the exclusion of intangible property or choses in action 
                                                                                                                     
 141.  Id. 
 142.  See Digital Products: E.U. Consumers Need Clear Rights, European Consumer 
Organisation, BEUC position paper, (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.beuc.org/publications/2012-
00832-01-e.pdf (arguing that digital products fulfilling these criteria should be treated as “goods” 
under relevant legislation). 
 143.  For a discussion on how digital assets may fulfill the requirements of possession in the 
context of the tort of conversion, see GREEN & RANDALL, supra note 4, at 118–20 (referring to 
excludability and movability, excludability and restricted access, and exhaustibility of the digital 
asset as being the relevant factors). 
 144.  Id. (discussing, for example, how the physicality of computer software is apparent from 
how it changes the hardware capacity once the computer software is stored on it, in the context of 
the eligibility of digital assets to the tort of conversion). 
 145.  See generally OSGA, supra note 9, § 1 (defining terms addressed in the Act). 
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does not apply to these types of information products. Adopting a 
purposive approach to the U.S. UCC to assess the nature of computer 
software, one commentator observed that the concerns for excluding 
intangibles such as “choses in action” from the definition of goods in the 
U.S. UCC are not present in the context of computer software:146 “while 
the UCC does distinguish between goods and things in action, excluding 
the latter from coverage, software, no matter how it is classified, should 
not fall within this exclusion. . . . It is unlike intangible legal rights, 
intangible laws and principles, and intangible assets.”147 Looking closer 
at how property law defines personal tangible property (choses in 
possession) and personal intangible property (choses in action), as well 
as the reasons underlying the exclusion of intangible property from sale 
of goods law, the requirement of a physical object to characterize an 
information product as a good is unwarranted and unjustified.  
There is no requirement of tangibility (understood in the narrow 
sense) in the definition of “goods,” as something that is perceptible by 
touch.148 The physical, concrete, and defined nature of information 
products like software, musical recordings, and e-books should be 
guiding factors in qualifying them as full-fledged goods conferred with 
more than the mere conceptual right to sue for their protection (as 
opposed to the conception of a debt or intellectual property). While they 
cannot be touched, and in some cases not seen, the pixels and binary 
codes that make up the musical recording or the film are as “physical” as 
the CDs or DVDs that support a digital copy.149 Ultimately, whether a 
specific information product constitutes a good, service, or both, or is of 
a sui generis nature, requires further analysis into the core attributes of 
                                                                                                                     
 146.  Horovitz, supra note 23, at 131–32. 
 147.  Id. at 151–52, 162.  
The fact that a computer program cannot be seen or felt should not preclude UCC 
coverage, as the UCC does not make those qualities the test for exclusion. The 
type of intangibility meant to be excluded from Article 2 that of choses in action, 
is different from the type of intangibility characteristic of software. That program 
instructions are intangible does not rule out UCC applicability, as programs can 
be identified, moved, transferred, and sold in the same manner as other pieces of 
personal property classified as goods. 
Id. For a contrary view, Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 
DUQ. L. REV. 459, 535–37 (2000) (explaining that computer software does not fulfill the 
requirement of “movability”).  
 148.  BRADGATE, supra note 12, at 41–42, 50. However, the European Union has made that 
distinction clear in its directives. See Directive 2011/83/EU, supra note 26, pmbl. (19), 2011 O.J. 
(L 304) 64, 66 (E.U.). 
 149.  An interesting analogy is found in Québec’s civil code, which states that “[w]aves or 
energy harnessed and put to use by man, whether their source is movable or immovable, are 
deemed corporeal movables.” CCQ, supra note 8, art. 906.  
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property and ownership.150 
The prevailing opinion that there needs to be a physical object 
embedding information products protected by copyright for the first sale 
or exhaustion doctrine to apply is another illustration of the confusion 
between tangible property and services. For example, E.U. regulations 
reflect a dichotomy between the distribution of physical objects 
embedding information products and the delivery of downloadable 
information products online, as if it necessarily implied that online 
information products could only involve services.151 By doing so, the 
E.U. regulations bury the delivery component of the distinct copy of an 
information product in the services, generally viewed as intangibles.152 
The function of the division between tangible and intangible property 
and the impact it has on the definition of goods and on the application of 
exceptions to copyright infringement (e.g., the first sale doctrine) signal 
that commercial copies of information products distributed online should 
reside prima facie on the tangible property side of the divide.  
2. Confusing Intellectual Property with Personal Property of an 
Information Product  
The inconsistent qualification of information products also occurs 
through the confusion between two distinct property rights: the intangible 
personal property of the intellectual property right holder in the 
information product (e.g., copyright in the musical or literary work) and 
the personal property of the recipient in the copy of the work. At times, 
courts are confused by the presence of the intangible property rights of 
copyright holders when ascertaining the nature of the object at issue (e.g., 
commercial copies of the information product per se).153 This trend is 
notable in computer software related case law (e.g., whether they 
                                                                                                                     
 150.  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 151.  Eric Tjong Tjin Tai, Exhaustion and Online Delivery of Digital Works, 25 EUR. 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. REV. 207, 208 (2003) (referring to the authoritative commentary by J. Gaster 
on the E.U. Database Directive, who was closely involved with the drafting of various E.U. 
directives pertinent to copyright exhaustion). For examples of such directives, see Directive 
2001/29/EU, supra note 96, art. 4(2).  
 152.  Tai, supra note 151. 
 153.  Jean Braucher, Contracting out of Article 2 Using a “License” Label: A Strategy that 
Should not Work for Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 268 (2007). Robinson v. 
Graves offers an older illustration of that confusion. See Robinson v. Graves, [1935] K.B. 579, 
583–84. There, the English Court of Appeal needed to decide whether the commissioning of a 
painting was a contract for skill and labor or one for the sale of goods. Id. Three of the judges 
invoked the exclusive copyright of the painter, which could only be assigned to the eventual 
purchaser of the painting by an act in writing, to conclude that the contract was one of skill and 
labor and not for the sale of goods, confusing the copyright with the property rights in the physical 
embodiment of the painting. Id. at 585, 591, 593. 
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constitute goods or whether copyright infringement took place),154 in a 
recent case involving the property nature of databases,155 or when courts 
conclude by extrapolation that a license to the embedded intellectual 
property necessarily implicates that the copy of the information product 
is licensed and not sold to the recipient.156 The confusion between 
intellectual property rights of the supplier and the property rights of the 
recipient or buyer is predominant in virtual worlds. As Greg Lastowka 
noted:  
[I]t is not unusual for many people, including lawyers, to assume 
that because virtual worlds feature creative expression and forms 
of intangible value, they are entirely controlled through the laws 
of intellectual property. 
 
That is not correct. While intellectual property law plays a key role 
in virtual worlds, it is a significant mistake to think that it occupies 
the entire field.157  
 
For Lastowka, virtual property (e.g., copies of creative works made 
accessible to virtual world users), may be akin to William 
Blackstone’s “incorporeal hereditaments,” and are properties distinct 
from the intellectual property of their supplier.158 
As opined in two leading American cases, the presence of the 
copyright in the information product is irrelevant to the qualification 
                                                                                                                     
 154.  See generally Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2 (giving an illustrative review of 
U.S. Copyright Case Law). In Southwark LBC v. IBM UK, Ltd., the Queen’s Bench Division 
decided that the U.K. Sale of Goods Act did not apply to software licenses because there was “no 
transfer of property.” [2011] EWHC (TCC) 549, [95]. In doing so, the court placed particular 
emphasis on the intellectual property rights of the supplier, and on the terms which pertained to 
the copy of the copyright work (i.e., no right of transfer, obligation to destroy the copy upon 
termination) with less emphasis on the fact that the licence in the copy of the software was 
perpetual (which could indicate that the copy had been transferred to the purchaser). See id. The 
same confusion arose in Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp., 845 F. 
Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994), and in Applied Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Daniel P. ICART & Brownstone 
Agency, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). The confusion between the exclusive rights of 
copyright holders and the ownership rights in the copy of the work also arises in the application 
of exceptions of copyright infringement including 17 U.S.C. § 117 “Limitations on exclusive 
rights: Computer programs.” 
 155.  See Your Response, Ltd. v. Datateam Bus. Media, Ltd., [2014] EWCA (Civ.) 281 
(holding that the common law lien could not apply to a database, the latter being intangible 
property). In Your Response, the court relied on the applicable Copyright and Rights in Databases 
Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/3032) regs. 6, which define the intellectual property rights in database 
as intangible property, without considering that the copy of a database could be a distinct form of 
property, separate from the intellectual property rights therein. Id. at [17]. 
 156.  BRADGATE, supra note 12, at 37. 
 157.  GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 168 (2010). 
 158.  Id. at 168–69. 
98 JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 20 
 
of the information product as good, service or of a sui generis nature. 
In Advent Systems, Ltd. v. Unisys Corp.159 and Triangle Underwriters, 
Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,160 computer software was held to constitute 
goods under the relevant statutes.161 In Triangle Underwriters, the 
U.S. District Court of E.D. New York observed:  
 
Although the ideas or concepts involved in the custom designed 
software remained Honeywell’s Intellectual Property, Triangle 
was purchasing the product of those concepts. That product 
required efforts to produce, but it was a product nevertheless, and 
though intangible, is more readily characterized as “goods” than 
“services.”162  
To be sure, the copy of a musical recording for which the copyright 
has expired (i.e., in which the copyright in the musical work, sound 
recording and performers’ performance no longer survives) after the 
consumer purchased the copy, does not change the nature of what the 
consumer is accessing (e.g., the copy of a musical work). Whether there 
is intangible copyright attached to the copy of the musical work or not 
should not be conclusive for the purpose of determining the nature of the 
product.163  
Confusion may arise in determining whether an information product 
is a good or service, between the ideas, the artistic or intellectual effort or 
quality that go into the completion of an information product, and the end 
product itself.164 This is a variance from the confusion between the 
                                                                                                                     
 159.  Advent Sys. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 160.  Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), 
affirmed on this issue, Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 747 (CANY 
1979). 
 161.  The distinction between the intangible intellectual property rights of the copyright 
holders which often remain their property and the nature of the product delivered to the purchaser 
was made in Triangle Underwriters. This case involved the supply of turnkey system including 
hardware, custom application software, training services and maintenance support services. Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  By contrast, the intangible nature of the rights of the copyright holder could be relevant 
to ascertain whether, in a transaction under which the copyright holder assigns her copyright to 
another party, sale of goods laws apply or not. See ATIYAH & ADAMS, supra note 23, at 66: “items 
of intellectual property such as copyrights, patents and trademarks are not personal chattels or 
corporeal movables and so fall outside the definition, although of course goods may exist which 
embody these intellectual property rights.” See also Rodau, supra note 23, at 882. 
 164.  For example in the case of software, it is reflected in the algorithms, coding 
instructions, and sequences leading to a software which performs distinct functions. This is 
particularly the case for contracts involving the delivery of a prototype or customized software or 
other product, in spite of the fact that the end product involves a physical, tangible, movable 
medium. Courts seem to be paying particular attention to the presence or not of standard 
commercialized product (a good) or an unfinished product (such as a prototype). For example, 
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intellectual property rights of the producer and personal property of the 
recipient of the information product discussed here.165 In Advent Systems, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, distinguished the two discreet 
components comprising copies of information products (i.e., the ideas 
and the commercialized end result) and emphasized the need to focus on 
the latter:  
Computer programs are the product of an intellectual process, but 
once implanted in a medium are widely distributed to computer 
owners. An analogy can be drawn to a compact disc recording of 
an orchestral rendition. The music is produced by the artistry of 
musicians and in itself is not a “good,” but when transferred to a 
laser-readable disc becomes a readily merchantable commodity. 
Similarly, when a professor delivers a lecture, it is not a good, but, 
when transcribed as a book, it becomes a good.166  
In that case, the Court held that computer software was a good for the 
purposes of the relevant statute.167 Courts make similar distinctions in 
strict liability cases whereby only the “tangible” end result—as opposed 
to the information, ideas, or embedded expression—may qualify as a 
product falling under such a purview.168 Thus, the presence of 
                                                                                                                     
see TK Power, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D.C.A. 2006), where the court held 
that the delivery of prototypes was a contract of services not goods. Textron was bargaining more 
for TK’s “knowledge, skill, and ability.” See also Data Processing Servs., Inc., 492 N.E.2d at 
318–19, (customized software held to be a service).  
 165.  The focus on the intellectual labor here typically serves to distinguish between 
contracts for the sale of goods and contracts for labor and material, as opposed to determining 
who owns the rights to the copy of the information product, and whether a sale or license of the 
copy took place.  
 166.  Advent Sys., Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (C.A.3 Pa. 1991). 
 167.  Id. See Keillian West, Ltd. v. Sportspage Enters., Ltd., 1982 1251 (AB QB) where the 
court made the distinction between the labor and the end product to decide that a contract for the 
printing of 20,000 sports programs was a contract for the sale of goods, not for the provision of 
services: “There is no reason to suppose that the substance of the contract was the skill and labour 
involved in the production of the programmes rather than the programmes themselves.”  
 168.  For example in Winter v G.P. Putnams’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991), the U.S. 
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, made the distinction between the ideas, expression and 
commercialized end result:  
A book containing Shakespeare’s sonnets consists of two parts, the material and 
print therein, and the ideas and expression thereof. The first may be a product, 
but the second is not. The latter, were Shakespeare alive, would be governed by 
copyright laws; the laws of libel, to the extent consistent with the First 
Amendment; and the laws of misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, 
negligence, and mistake. These doctrines applicable to the second part are aimed 
at the delicate issues that arise with respect to intangibles such as ideas and 
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intangibles, such as ideas and information,  in the creation or 
commercialized end result does not disqualify the end result from being 
defined as a good. It is almost inconceivable that ideas, concepts, trade 
secrets, information in the development process, or the end product are 
not part and parcel of goods.169 
The classification of various forms of property is not foreign to the 
concept of transformation (e.g., from immovable to movable property or 
from real to personal property in the Anglo-American tradition) 
depending on the context.170 While sounds and visual elements have an 
intangible nature that may well constitute the essence of a musical 
recording or a film, they form part of “goods” when embedded in a 
commercialized product through their registration in binary codes or 
otherwise.171  
As physical boundaries disappear for information products distributed 
online without a physical object, eliminating the reminder that there is 
some personal property and a good involved, it is likely that the observed 
trend of the intangible intellectual property of right holders defining the 
whole transaction will continue. 
B. Suppliers’ Role in Shaping Information Products 
Suppliers’ commercial practices, particularly where non-negotiated 
standard terms of use prevail, shape to a large extent courts 
characterization, as well as how recipients perceive information 
products.172 This is especially true with information products, where new 
                                                                                                                     
expression. Products liability law is geared to the tangible world. 
In that case, the plaintiff claimed that product strict liability regime applied to the publishers of a 
book on mushrooms on which they relied and as a result of which they became very sick after 
having eaten certain mushrooms. See also Sanders v Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 
(D. Colo. 2002); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798 (WDKY 2000). 
 169.  Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948) (noting 
this): 
There is scarcely to be found any article susceptible to sale or rent that is not the 
result of an idea, genius, skill and labor applied to a physical substance. A loaf 
of bread is the result of the skill and labour of the cook who mixed the physical 
ingredients and applied heat at the temperature and consistency her judgment 
dictated. A radio is the result of the thought of a genius, or several such persons, 
combined with the skill and labour of trained technicians applied to a tangible 
mass of substance. An automobile is the result of all these elements, and of 
patents, etc.; and so on, ad infinitum. 
 170.  For example, in the civil law tradition, see CCQ, supra note 8, arts. 900–03.  
 171.  In the context of the nature of computer software, see Rodau, supra note 23, at 875. 
 172.  Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 1225, 1231–35. Attribute the deference courts 
have to how suppliers characterize the information product in the contract to a specific view of 
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technologies and commercial offerings challenge previous conceptions 
and bring the law to unchartered territories. The new grounds provide 
more leeway to align and shape the information products with the 
suppliers’ interests, a trend that can be observed in virtual worlds.173 
Framing the contract as one of services may engender lower levels of 
protection of recipients and different remedies than if the contract 
involves goods.174 Licensing the copy of the information product rather 
than selling it allows suppliers to retain more control on the product 
generally, and circumvent the application of exceptions to copyright 
infringement beneficial to recipients (including the first sale or 
exhaustion doctrine).175  
Courts generally rely on the terms of the contract to assess whether 
the information is a good, a service or sui generis, whether there is a sale 
or a license, and how the rights of intellectual property suppliers should 
hold in these assessments. Unless there is a legal principle or doctrine that 
makes the terms unenforceable, courts tend to defer to the terms of the 
contract. The deference to the terms of the contract to determine the 
nature of information products begs several questions. For one, to what 
extent are property interests malleable by contract and to what extent is it 
desirable to delegate the regulation of information products to private 
ordering, particularly given the current prevalence of standardized non-
negotiated-contracts?176 Second, what legal species are suppliers 
precisely creating? In order words, how does the law affect recipients and 
suppliers of copies of information products purchased for a one-time fee? 
Does the recipient maintain indefinite autonomous control even if she 
may not transfer the copy to another party? To what extent does the 
supplier retain property rights in the copies made available once the 
product is delivered to the recipient? Do these uncategorized rights to 
copies of information products, both from the perspective of suppliers 
and of recipients, not deserve more legal scrutiny?  
The confusion identified above, between the personal property of the 
recipient in the information product, and the intellectual property of 
suppliers embedded in the product,177 enables suppliers’ ability to shape 
the nature of the information product and related transaction. The 
intellectual property rights of suppliers overshadow the underlying 
                                                                                                                     
property as being “an infinitely malleable bundle of rights.” Recipients may be favorably biased 
toward the accuracy and legality of standard terms and conditions based on their trust of the firm, 
in particular of large, reputable firms. See also RADIN, supra note 82, at 12. 
 173.  On how suppliers are seeking to eliminate emerging virtual property through contract, 
see Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1082–84 (2005). 
 174.  See supra Part II.A. 
 175.  See discussion supra Parts II.B & II.C. 
 176.  I look further into these questions in infra Part IV.B. 
 177.  See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
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property rights of recipients unfairly shifting the balance of power to 
favor the holders of intellectual property. This imbalance overrides basic 
rights, privileges and powers that are common attributes of recipients’ 
property, giving intellectual property right holders carte blanche in how 
they shape the entire transaction through standard non-negotiated 
contracts.  
C. Assessment: What is at Stake? 
Looking at the uneasiness to transmute the law of physical objects to 
the online virtual world described so far, one could respond with 
skepticism at attempts to mirror the offline world to the online world: 
what are the underlying justifications to defer to old property rules to 
define information products in the online world? Should concepts such 
as delivery, possession, powers of transmission and transfer give way to 
new rules given their transformation in the online world? The short 
answer to critiques against mimicking traditional property concepts to the 
online world is that property, as a hard-wired concept, remains at the 
center of the commercialization of information products online, including 
virtual worlds. Suppliers invoke their intellectual property interests and 
rights in various ways: to restrict recipients’ power to transfer copies of 
information products, so as to avoid the application of the first sale 
doctrine; to claim rights to recipients’ enhancements to the information 
products they supplied, or to bury possible ownership rights of 
information product recipients in the platform which suppliers own or 
through the related services that they provide to recipients. Suppliers’ 
stronghold on information products requires an evenhanded legal and 
normative approach that calls for a greater articulation of recipients’ 
property rights. The questions become: what reallocations of property 
interests take place as a result of the requirements of a physical object, 
juxtaposed with the intangible intellectual property rights of right 
holders? What are the legal and normative effects of these reallocations 
and do they give rise to double standards? Should they be rectified? 
1. Replacement of Recipients’ Property Freedoms with Suppliers’ 
Control Powers 
The trends identified so far lead to a decrease of recipients’ rights to 
information products. The trend adds on to the well-documented 
constraining effects of technological protection measures and their legal 
endorsement worldwide on recipients’ rights to information products.178 
There too, the emphasis on the presence of a physical object is noticeable, 
                                                                                                                     
 178.  See Chapdelaine, supra note 80, at 21–26. 
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as courts have been more reluctant to enforce technological protection 
measures when embedded in a physical object (e.g., a garage door lock) 
than in absence of it.179 Some may argue that this is the inevitable result 
of the digital revolution, that in order to survive, suppliers of information 
products must respond with legal and technological ammunition to the 
facility with which users can copy, share and distribute information 
products. Recipients have much to gain too by technological 
enhancements: increasing multiplicity of uses, flexibility and 
convenience (e.g., through the cloud: storage space, shifting access 
devices, on-demand access, and increased offerings). Under that view, 
the shrinking of recipients’ legal rights may be largely compensated by 
their gains as technologically empowered consumers. For this line of 
argument to have value, one needs to assume that the decline in 
recipients’ ownership rights is necessary for information products to 
subsist and for their recipients to benefit from incessant technological 
empowerment. Otherwise, the allegedly inevitable trade-off of recipients’ 
property rights for enhanced consumer experience should be more 
adequately described as a window of opportunity for suppliers to increase 
their power over recipients, by sowing dependency and creating new 
revenue streams. The case has yet to be made that the reallocation of 
property rights away from recipients of information products is essential 
and inevitable.180  
To assess what it is that recipients are losing and if it is of significant 
value, one may turn to the theoretical foundations of property as a means 
to organize everyday life, commerce and relationships, and as a tool of 
power allocation. James Harris’s influential conception of property in 
Property and Justice181 usefully provides a detailed account of the 
“ownership spectrum” which proves particularly helpful to assert the 
nature of rights to information products.182  
Harris views property as a necessary vehicle of freedom and 
autonomous choice, through the ubiquitous manifestation in society of a 
wide spectrum of ownership interests.183 Ownership is an “organizing 
idea” under which all of these interests share (to varying degrees) open-
                                                                                                                     
 179.  See Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1119 (2007). 
 180.  The shrinking or recipients property rights at the expense of suppliers raises similar 
questions to the ones involved in the debate on the merits of technological protection measures as 
endorsed by international copyright conventions and national legislation worldwide. See 
Chapdelaine, supra note 80, at 21–26; Carys Craig, Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing and 
Anti-Circumvention in Bill C-32, in FROM RADICAL EXTREMISM TO BALANCED COPYRIGHT: 
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL AGENDA 177 (Michael Geist ed., 2010).  
 181.  HARRIS, supra note 3. See PROPERTIES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JIM HARRIS 
(Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2006). 
 182.  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 183.  HARRIS, supra note 3. 
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ended privileges, powers and self-seekingness with respect to a 
resource.184 To invoke freedom as a moral justification for maintaining a 
property institution, one must ask, “whether inherent property freedoms 
are a necessary feature of the just society.”185 The proposition is that quite 
apart from instrumental reasons, “property institutions, by their very 
nature, confer freedoms (ranges for autonomous choice) which would not 
exist without them; and for this reason no citizen is treated justly by his 
community unless it institutes or maintains a property institution.”186 
Hence, open-ended uses and privileges nurture freedoms that contribute 
to autonomous choice and prima facie justify property institutions.187 
Harris arrives at this conclusion by finding no convincing argument that 
any of the powers and privileges on the ownership spectrum should be a 
priori excluded from the concept of ownership: “[t]he spectrum has 
evolved in human history and is available within property institutions as 
a means of conferring ranges of autonomous choice on individuals or 
groups.”188  
A contrario, if there were no property-specific justice reasons to 
support those freedoms, “countless day-to-day unquestioned assumptions 
about people being free to do what they like with their own things and 
their own money would turn out to be morally suspect.”189 Autonomy is 
a value frequently invoked to justify property and more particularly 
personal property.190  
When suppliers constrain the capacity of recipients to own 
                                                                                                                     
 184.  Id. at 63ff. See discussion infra Part IV.A (applying the three components of the 
ownership spectrum to information products). 
 185.  HARRIS, supra note 3, at 231. 
 186.  Id. at 230; see JAMES O. GRUNEBAUM, PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 182–83 (1987) (basing the 
moral justification of ownership in autonomy, developing a theory of “autonomous ownership,” 
and within that framework, acknowledging how use controls of consumer goods violate 
autonomy: “Community control over consumer goods, either in the form of what goods are 
produced or control in the form of what uses consumer products may be put to, would violate 
autonomy.”). 
 187.  HARRIS, supra note 3, at 231. 
 188.  Id. at 275. 
 189.  Id. at 65; see also GRUNEBAUM, supra note 186, at 183. 
 190.  See, e.g., GRUNEBAUM, supra note 186, at  183: 
The idea that autonomy requires a wide range of rights of title over consumer 
goods implies that so called consumer sovereignty is a moral as well as the 
economic requirement to maintain the value of income and to achieve or measure 
efficiency. That consumers legitimately exercise a wide range of rights of title 
over goods for personal consumption applies not only to what they actually 
purchase but to what is available for their purchase. Not only should individuals 
be able to exercise a broad range of rights of title over their living quarters, for 
example, but they should also have a wide range of options about the kinds of 
living quarters made available. 
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information products through contract, and when courts endorse such 
schemes, the nurtured freedoms allowing open-ended countless acts 
unrestricted by state control are impaired. To some extent, the level of 
autonomy and freedom away from the state, made possible through the 
vehicle that is property, is taken away for the benefit and control of the 
firm. The prima facie open-ended powers and privileges that go without 
saying when owning a resource become potentially suspicious 
reviewable acts subject to the firm’s surveillance. This is the shift 
occurring when contract, instead of property concepts, dictates the rights 
to information product that in all respects have the attributes of a 
resource. The shift to contracts to control innumerable resources utilized 
by recipients undermines the traditional justification for the creation of 
property rights to ensure the most effective allocation and use of 
resources.191  
Consequently, the shift takes away recipients’ benefit to sale of goods 
warranties that would otherwise apply (implied warranties of quality, 
fitness for use, title and quiet possession) and the application of the first 
sale doctrine and other exceptions to copyright infringement to the benefit 
of recipients of information products. Given the overall policy objective 
of consumer protection laws and the additional level of protection that 
they offer to consumers,192 any issue of scope that may discredit the 
application of statutory implied obligations to consumer transactions 
needs to be examined carefully. When this exclusion affects an 
increasingly large segment of the consumer market (i.e., information 
products distributed online), there is cause for concern. When it is 
compounded with the increasing trivialization of the ownership rights in 
copies of information products, an alarming pattern of diminished rights 
and protection for consumers starts to take shape. 
Beyond taking away open-ended powers and privileges of information 
product recipients, some suppliers’ efforts to become owners of all 
enhancements made gratuitously by recipients on their copies of 
information products have been analogized, endorsed even, as a new form 
of feudalism.193 Are these resource allocations desirable? What ground 
rules, if any, may limit the malleability of how suppliers can define 
resources, constrain recipients’ property interests, or inflate their own 
property interests through contract?  
                                                                                                                     
 191.  See Fairfield, supra note 173, at 1064–76 (application of various property theories to 
virtual property). 
 192.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 193.  See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Virtual World Feudalism, 118 YALE L.J. Pocket Part 
126 (2009) (analogizing the relationship between operators and users of virtual worlds as one of 
feudalism and arguing that such relationship is defensible). 
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2. Double Standards 
The requirement of a physical object juxtaposed with the intangible 
intellectual property of right holders in the information products leads to 
double standards in how courts and legislators account for the property 
rights of suppliers (intellectual property holders) in comparison to the 
rights of recipients. The general trend of courts and legislators to favor 
the rights of intellectual property holders by minimizing property rights 
in the copies of information products exemplifies the double standard.194 
The requirement of a physical object for the copy of an information 
product to qualify as a good under sale of goods law, while the same 
requirement of a physical object is not required for a copy to be infringing 
under copyright law, further illustrates the double standard being applied 
between right holders and recipients of information products.195 
Moreover, the non-application of the first sale doctrine to information 
products distributed online is yet another manifestation wherein the rights 
and interests of intellectual property holders are bolstered at the expense 
of the power of transfer normally vested to recipients of information 
products.196  
A possible response to the double standard critique is that it may be 
justifiable on policy grounds to assign different weights to competing 
property interests given the interests’ inherent nature and respective 
functions. No property interests are absolute; all can be subject to 
legitimate limitations including property-limitation rules.197 For example, 
copyright restrains the right of users to make reproductions of the work, 
unless the copies are permitted pursuant to an exception to copyright 
infringement (e.g., fair dealing, fair use, reproduction for private 
purposes, non-commercial user generated content). The intellectual 
property of copyright holders would take precedence over the personal 
property of users by restraining their ability to make copies without 
compensation in a way that competes with the economic rights of 
copyright holders. In the case of the requirement of a physical object for 
the copy of an information product to qualify as a good or for first sale to 
apply, the discussion about the competing property interests is at times 
completely absent, or at best, fails to duly take into account the purpose 
                                                                                                                     
 194.  See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 195.  See Jean Braucher, Contracting Out of Article 2 Using A “License” Label: A Strategy 
that Should Not Work for Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 268 (2006); see also Juliet 
M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 159, 167–68 
(2010). 
 196.  See supra Part II.C.  
 197.  See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 34 (defining property-limitation rules as where prima facie 
normative claims, founded on the prevailing ownership conception, are overridden, and said rules 
are premised on the notion that, but for the limitation they contain, the owner would be free to do 
as he pleases). 
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and function of personal property interests in copies of information 
products.198 The question for courts and legislators is whether the 
disparate treatment that different types of copies of information products 
receive does not amount to an illegitimate double standard. Unfortunately 
at this point, it does not appear that this question has been addressed 
properly.  
3. Legal and Normative Incoherence 
The resulting legal and normative incoherence caused by both the 
degradation of the property freedoms afforded to recipients of 
information products for the benefit of suppliers’ contractual powers and 
the double standards to how concepts of goods or property are applied 
should concern courts and policymakers. 
As information products share the same attributes of property in all 
respects, failing to enforce the personal property rights of recipients of 
such products either by deferring to the terms of supplier contracts or by 
disqualifying such products due to physical form may lead to dissonance 
and arbitrary results.199 Ultimately, it risks undermining the efficiency 
and moral grounds imbued within property institutions that have helped 
to shape and organize human societies for millennia.200 In order to avoid 
this legal and normative degradation, what are the attributes of personal 
property that should enlighten conceptions of and the co-existence 
between tangible and intangible property? How can property interests be 
altered by contract and if so, under what justifications and ground rules?  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 198.  See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 1245–60 (arguing that copy owners need 
to be distinguished from the public as a matter of copyright policy on the basis of inter alia, 
consumer incentives to discourage copyright infringement). 
 199.  See GREEN & RANDALL, supra note 4, at 124 (raising similar concerns of consistency 
on the reluctance to apply the tort of conversion to digital assets).  
 200.  Id. at 124–25 (regarding the reluctance by courts to apply the tort of conversion to 
digital assets): 
Digitized assets are commodities in the same way as those assets which are 
conventionally protected by the law of property. Failing to safeguard property 
interests in them will have the same effects as failing to recognise property in 
traditional assets, since the legal relationship between person and asset is much 
the same where both types of assets are concerned. As we have seen, it is the 
behaviour of the parties in relation to the assets in question which is, or should 
be, determinative of whether a conversion has occurred. 
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IV. RELOCATING THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN 
INFORMATION PRODUCTS 
What are the required elements of an information product that justify 
dispensing with the physical object and treating it as a functional 
equivalent for the benefit of its recipient? When should property rights in 
the information product (the good) be recognized and allocated to the 
recipient and when should the information product be treated as a service 
with the related property interests being mostly retained by the supplier? 
The answer lies in great part in the relationship the recipient has with the 
information product and in particular, her ability to own the information 
product. It also depends largely on the malleability of property interests 
through contracts. 
A. Recipients’ Ownership of Information Products  
As information products that have no supporting physical media tend 
to be fluid, the dividing lines between the product, the method of delivery, 
the underlying code structure and operational services are not clear. The 
concept of ownership as an organizing idea201 and legal construct focuses 
on the relationship between the person and the resource,202 which is 
central to the proper characterization and regulation of information 
products. While possession is useful to identify the presence of personal 
property and of a good, ownership, when asserted in favor of recipients 
is a tipping point in how information products are regulated. 
The legal analysis of ownership aims to distill the essential 
characteristics that should be present for an information product to 
qualify as the personal property of its recipient and as good. This exercise 
will bring a more refined understanding of tangible personal property 
beyond an object capable of being touched, and broaden the meaning of 
tangible by encompassing its secondary meanings.203 
In Property and Justice, James Harris defines the essence of every 
property institution as the twin manifestation of trespassory rules204 and 
                                                                                                                     
 201.  See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 63ff. 
 202.  See id. at 67 (“Ownership powers of control and transmission all involve capacity to 
create relations with others by virtue of a person’s ownership of something. Powers to control 
uses by others are as open-ended a class as are ownership use-privileges.”). 
 203.  See Definition of Tangible, CANADIAN OXFORD DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2004) (stating the 
secondary meanings of “tangible” are “clearly intelligible; that can be grasped by the mind, not 
elusive or visionary” or “substantial” definite; that may be clearly viewed, evaluated, or 
calculated” or a “a tangible thing, esp. an asset.”). 
 204.  See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 24, 86 (referring to “trespassory rules” as all rules which, 
by reference to a resource, impose obligations (negative or positive) upon an open ended range of 
persons, with the exception of some privileged individual, group, or agency (i.e., the owner(s)); 
they are open-ended and give rise to various civil or criminal remedies such as damages, 
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the existence of an ownership spectrum.205 Harris’s influential conception 
of property offers one among numerous accounts of the main attributes 
of property and of the nature of ownership.206 The “twin-manifestation” 
framework that Harris proposes to define property emphasizes the 
“bundle of rights” notion that is often ascribed to property, as well as the 
power to exclude, opposable to all.207  
According to Harris, we need to understand the underlying “property-
specific justice reasons” that withstand each form of property to 
determine its proper scope.208 Harris’s tailored approach to the nature of 
the resource (e.g., an information product) and the underlying reasons for 
its legal protection are highly pertinent to define the personal tangible 
property of information products.  
The various forms of ownership on Harris’s “ownership spectrum” 
have in common: (i) a juridical relation between a person and a 
resource,209 (ii) privileges and powers that are open ended and (iii) that 
authorize self-seekingness by the owner.210 These three requirements will 
serve to identify when tangible personal property may subsist in 
information products accessed by recipients.  
1. Juridical Relation Between a Person and a Resource 
The requirement of a juridical relation between a person and a 
resource on the ownership spectrum implies that the person and the 
resource can be separately identified.211 Identifying a resource requires 
that it can be circumscribed. In the context of information products, 
                                                                                                                     
possessory recovery, injunction, or restitution, and they presuppose the existence of a separate, 
reasonably identifiable resource). 
 205.  Id. at 5 (stating the ownership spectrum spans from “mere property” to “full-blooded 
ownership.”). 
 206.  See TONY HONORÉ, MAKING LAW BIND ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 165–79 
(1987) (providing on the concept of ownership a detailed account of the incidents of ownership 
which include: the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the income 
and capital of the thing, the right to security and the duty to prevent harm); see also GRUNEBAUM, 
supra note 186, at 3, 182. 
 207.  See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 5 (describing property institutions as encompassing the 
twin manifestation of trespassory rules and the presence of an ownership spectrum which 
comprises powers and privileges between a person and a resource that are prima facie open-
ended). For a brief overview of various conceptions of property, see Pascale Chapdelaine, The 
Property Attributes of Copyright, 10 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 34, 52–53 (2014). 
 208.  HARRIS, supra note 3, at 168. 
 209.  Id. at 332 (implying the ability to identify each and a separateness between the two); 
JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 105–28 (1997).  
 210.  HARRIS, supra note 3, at 65 (Self-seekingness refers to this intimate relationship 
between the owner and the resource as to how she chooses to dispose of the resource, with prima 
facie no duty to account to any one for the merit or rationality of that preference).  
 211.  Id. at 332 (This is a requirement for any property institution); PENNER, supra note 209, 
at 105–28. 
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fixation in some perceptible form for independent and autonomous 
consumption would fulfill that requirement.212 For instance, consumers’ 
abilities to access digital products on a permanent basis and to store them, 
should be determining factors for assessing whether digital content could 
qualify as a good.213 Directive 2011/83/EU opted for a different approach, 
treating digital content with no physical supporting medium exchanged 
hand-to-hand as neither goods nor services, but as sui generis.214 As 
opposed to the ability to access digital products on a permanent basis, the 
sequential release of information that is not fixed for the ongoing 
independent and autonomous consumption of the recipient (e.g., a 
performance in public of a play or a broadcast) would not have the 
attributes of a resource for the recipient’s purposes.215  
Identifying a distinct resource implies some form of scarcity. 
Intellectual property laws create artificial scarcity (e.g., through 
copyright) to prohibit unauthorized reproduction and other acts that could 
otherwise be performed freely with respect to a work of authorship.216 
Because intellectual property rights are often present in information 
products, the artificial scarcity enables the creation of rival, individually 
identifiable lawful copies of information products. The copy of an 
information product downloaded lawfully from the Internet becomes the 
copy of the recipient, which sets it apart from all others.217 The copy of 
the information products becomes even more unique when the recipient 
adapts or modifies it for her own personal uses.218 This ability to 
                                                                                                                     
 212.  See Horovitz, supra note 23, at 132–33; 151–52. 
 213.  Position paper on the regulation of digital products prepared by BEUC. Digital 
Products, How to Include them in the Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive, at 5 (June 9, 
2010), available at http://www.beuc.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=2135 [hereinafter Digital 
Products]; About BEUC, BEUC, http://www.beuc.org/about-beuc/who-we-are (last visited Apr. 
6, 2015) (stating that BEUC is the European Consumers’ Organization that acts as the umbrella 
organization for 40 independent national consumer organizations across Europe. Its main task is 
to represent the interests of these organizations and all consumers across Europe). 
 214.  See Directive 2011/83/EU, supra note 26, recital p. 25. 
 215.  Copyright law imposes a requirement of fixation for works of authorship to be 
protected. See, e.g., Galerie d’art du Petit Champlain, Inc. v. Théberge, 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2 
S.C.R. 336, ¶ 145 (Can.) (stating “[t]he work is, so to speak, the physical outcome of the creative 
process. Fixation of the work in a medium is a condition sine qua non of the production of a 
work.” The requirement of fixation in copyright law and the qualification of goods in sale of goods 
law (and consumer law) share a common preoccupation of an identifiable and perceptible product 
that persists in time beyond its moment of creation or interpretation). 
 216.  HARRIS, supra note 3, at 42–43; Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and 
Free Riding, TEXAS L. REV. 1031, 1055 (2005). 
 217.  On the discussion of rivalry and virtual property, see Fairfield, supra note 173, at 1053–
55, who suggests that the perfect digital copies of copyright works do not embody the same rivalry 
aspects as virtual property developed in virtual worlds.  
 218.  See, e.g., Geoffrey Fowler, Amazon Pays for Eating Student’s Homework, WALL ST. 
J.L. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2009, 2:14 p.m.), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/10/01/amazon-pays-for-
eating-students-homework/?mod=rss_WSJBlog (discussing claims recipients of information 
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personalize immaterial copies of information products largely 
compensates for the lack of distinct physical object boundaries for the 
purpose of assessing the actual level of rivalry posed by numerous digital 
copies of the same copyright work.   
2. Open-ended Privileges and Powers 
The second feature common to all ownership interests on the 
ownership spectrum is that the privileges and powers that a person has in 
a resource are prima facie open-ended.219 The open-ended texture of 
powers and privileges distinguishes ownership interests from other non-
ownership proprietary interests that confer specific privileges and 
powers.220 The infinite ways by which a person can prima facie interact 
with a resource distinguish ownership interests in a resource from a 
product the use of which would be entirely governed by the terms of a 
contract as is sometimes the case in virtual worlds.221 The significance of 
prima facie open-ended powers and privileges to define ownership of a 
resource as opposed to other legal relationships, is often overlooked when 
defining property as an infinitely malleable bundle of rights.  
Copyright increasingly limits some of the prima facie open-ended 
privileges and powers to copies of information products.222 Although 
copyright shapes to a large extent the privileges and powers of recipients 
of information products and is highly relevant in the broader discussion 
of the scope of copyright user rights, copyright does not preclude 
ownership in copies of information products. The underlying intellectual 
property of right holders needs to be separated from the present 
assessment of sorting out which information products should qualify as 
recipients’ personal tangible property and as goods, as opposed to the 
property of suppliers, or as services.  
The ability to exercise open-ended privileges and powers implies 
some physical control of the resource. For instance, recipients of 
information products may exercise physical control over copies they 
                                                                                                                     
products may have on enhancements they make on their digital copies, specifically referencing a 
successful settlement between Amazon and a student who sued when Amazon deleted his e-book, 
thus deleting his homework assignment); see also Caitlin J. Akins, Conversion of Digital 
Property: Protecting Consumers in the Age of Technology, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 215, 244–
46 (2010).  
 219.  HARRIS, supra note 3, at 5. 
 220.  Id. at 55–58 (stating that easements, for example, would fall under the category of non-
ownership proprietary interests). 
 221.  The rights of members to virtual world sites have been largely defined by contract. See 
generally Fairfield, supra note 173; see also GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 193 (2010). 
 222.  A specific view of property as being “an infinitely malleable bundle of rights” has 
effects in the online world and intersection between contract and property. See Perzanowski & 
Schultz, supra note 2, at 1225, 1233–34. 
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download (e.g., ability to identify a copy as one’s own, store it, and 
autonomously use it without resorting to a service provider). A musical 
recording or copy of film lawfully downloaded from the Internet (should) 
give(s) recipients the open-ended privileges and powers to enjoy the work 
autonomously through physical control, with powers of transfer. By 
contrast, the streaming or broadcast of a film does not give the same 
autonomous capacity to consumers, although with on-demand streaming 
and other services, the level of autonomy that consumers enjoy with 
respect to the service comes closer to the autonomy of an owner. 
Recipients of streaming services do not exercise prima facie open-ended 
physical control over the copy they stream, to the extent that a large 
portion of the physical power remains in the hands of the service provider 
(i.e., the copy is stored on a server over which the recipient has no 
physical control, and each individual access to the information product is 
incumbent upon the service provider making streaming available). 
Recipients may have a transferable interest in a subscription to the on-
demand streaming services, which may share the attributes of a property 
interest. However, the power of control and transfer pertains to the 
subscription to the service, not to the information product per se.  
Movability has been invoked as one of the open-ended privileges that 
should be a determining factor to qualify information products as tangible 
personal property as opposed to a service or intangible property, in 
particular in the context of the U.S. UCC.223 One commentator noted with 
respect to the categorization of computer software, “A program is 
intangible in the sense that it cannot be touched or felt, but not in the sense 
that it cannot be moved and identified to a contract.”224 Computer 
programs and other copies of information products are movable tradable 
objects regardless of their material form.225 Movability is the underlying 
requirement for the transfer of ownership as another means to distinguish 
specific goods from other products.226  
The power to transfer title to a resource is among the most important 
of all open-ended powers and privileges of ownership.227 The power to 
transfer title to a resource is central to sale of goods and related consumer 
                                                                                                                     
 223.  Horovitz, supra note 23, at 162 (noting with respect to the categorization of computer 
software under the U.S. UCC: “A program is intangible in the sense that it cannot be touched or 
felt, but not in the sense that it cannot be moved and identified to a contract.”). 
 224.  Id. But see Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 
DUQ. L. REV. 459, 535–36 (2000) (giving a contrary view that computer software does not fulfill 
the requirement of “movability.”). 
 225.  See Jean Braucher, Contracting Out of Article 2 Using A “License” Label: A Strategy 
that Should Not Work for Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 268 (2006) (stating that 
“[s]oftware copies can be moved in various ways, including on computers and disks and by 
electronic download.”). 
 226.  See Smith & Woods, supra note 43, at 45.  
 227.  See HONORÉ, supra note 206, at 165–79 (giving the components of ownership). 
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protection laws, the concept of sale traditionally embedding transfer of 
title.228 The ability to transfer a resource to someone else is a determining 
factor in distinguishing goods from services. As noted with respect to the 
classification of goods and services under World Trade Organization and 
E.U. law:  
On one level, the notion of property transfer appears inherently 
bound up with goods and not services because the acquisition of 
ownership from the producer is predicated on the transfer of 
possession of the product. Such possession entails “actual holding 
or having something as one’s own,” implying either physical 
existence of the thing possessed or the right to exercise control 
over the product.229 
Often, recipients’ inability to transfer the copy to the information 
product is imposed by the supplier, either through a contractual restriction 
or through technological protection measures. In determining which 
information products can be owned by recipients, barriers imposed by the 
supplier need to be distinguished from other physical or conceptual 
barriers to ownership (e.g., the information product is not under the 
physical control of the recipient and therefore recipient has no power to 
transfer it). The distinction between barriers imposed by suppliers and 
other physical barriers lies in suppliers’ power to shape the nature of 
information products. When an information product fulfills for all other 
intents and purposes the requirements of ownership by their recipient, the 
restriction on transfer imposed by suppliers needs to pass the same level 
of scrutiny as any other restrictions on the alienation of property.  
3. Privileges and Powers that Authorize Self-Seekingness to the Owner 
The third feature common to all ownership interests on the ownership 
spectrum is that the privileges and powers that a person has in the 
resource authorize self-seekingness for the owner.230 Self-seekingness is 
the intimate relationship between the owner and the resource as to how 
the owner chooses to dispose of the resource, with prima facie no duty to 
account to any one on the merit or rationality of that preference.231  
The self-seekingness requirement for ownership to subsist in a 
resource is particularly helpful to highlight the impact that copyright 
                                                                                                                     
 228.  See GERALD H.L. FRIDMAN, SALE OF GOODS IN CANADA 61 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing 
the various potential meanings of “property” and “transfer of property” when employed in a sale 
of goods law framework); see also ATIYAH & ADAMS, supra note 23, at 68–71. 
 229.  Smith & Woods, supra note 43, at 45. 
 230.  HARRIS, supra note 3, at 5. 
 231.  See id. at 65. 
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holders’ rights have on recipients’ enjoyment of information products. 
Given the inherent power of copyright holders to restrict the performance 
of defined acts on their works without their authorization, recipients have 
a lot to account for to copyright holders. As a result, recipients’ ownership 
of copies of information products subject to copyright sits significantly 
lower on the ownership spectrum than other goods.  
The self-seekingness requirement of ownership is helpful to 
distinguish the copies of information products that may be owned by their 
recipients from those that may not. The self-seekingness aspect common 
to all ownership interests is also helpful to discern another important 
feature that recipients are forfeiting when they do not own the copies of 
information products that they access. An information product accessed 
through on-demand streaming services would allow some level of self-
seekingness to the recipient (i.e., no duty to account to anyone (e.g., the 
time of day, frequency, purpose of use, in what circles)) while still being 
constrained to a large extent by the streaming service provider (the 
specific information product may only be available for a limited period 
of time, the service may be down from time to time, or the recipient may 
not have access to an internet connection at any given time, the recipient 
may abandon the service provider if the fees increase, or the service 
supplier may be out of business; in all scenarios, the recipient would stop 
having access to the information product). In contrast, when the recipient 
downloads the copy of an information product to her computer or on his 
Internet storage space, the recipient would be allowed to a greater level 
of self-seekingness in that she could enjoy the information product 
independently, autonomously, and for an indefinite duration.  
Here too, the obstacles to ownership imposed by the supplier contract 
terms need to be distinguished from other conceptual or physical barriers 
to owning copies of information products (as it would be the case where 
the copy is accessed through an on-demand streaming service).232 Copies 
of information products provided under supplier contract denying any 
ownership rights to the recipient, but which for all intents and purposes 
give the same level of self-seekingness as if they were legally owned by 
the recipient, are among the factors that a court should consider to 
determine whether a sale of the information product took place regardless 
of contract terms to the contrary.233  
                                                                                                                     
 232.  See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 233.  Freedom of contract will generally guide courts to defer to the contract terms (assuming 
they are enforceable). In some cases, and when policy reasons justify court’s intervention, courts 
have taken a substantive and functional approach to interpret computer license agreements as 
effectively amounting to a sale. See, e.g., Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 
2012 E.C.R. at 10; see supra text accompanying notes 71-87. 
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B. Property Versus Contracts 
Once the relevant criteria to assert tangible property interests in 
information products have been identified, supplier contract terms that 
suggest that the information product does not confer property rights to 
the recipient, or that suppress property powers and privileges, should 
come under a different scrutiny. Failure to recognize recipients’ property 
interests may lead to double standards in addition to legal and normative 
incoherence in a way that risks undermining the foundations and function 
of the property institution, including important efficiency considerations. 
The lack of recognition of recipients’ personal property interests in 
information products may also bring to the fore the legitimacy of the 
scope of copyright and other forms of intellectual property. As property 
interests in information products are a vehicle promoting distinct values 
that need to be recognized and preserved, courts and legislators should be 
particularly attentive when the contracts are non-negotiated standard 
terms (which is prevalent in the commercialization of information 
products). It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed 
account of the extent to which contracts may shape property interests. 
Suffice here to make a few remarks on the various legal tools that should 
be considered to mediate between the property interests in copies of 
information products and contradictory or unfavorable supplier contract 
terms.  
The conception of property and ownership adopted here to better 
define the nature of information products sets inherent limits to the 
malleability of the bundle of rights that ownership proprietary interests 
entail.234 Beyond the size of the circle of persons against whom the 
property or contract right can be asserted (i.e., trespassory powers in rem 
versus rights in personam) it is the prima facie open-ended powers and 
privileges that the recipient has with respect to the product authorizing 
self-seekingness (as opposed to a closed list of dos and don’ts) that set 
property interests apart from contract rights.  
One may argue that we should confer suppliers as much flexibility as 
possible to develop their commercial offerings, (with market forces 
ensuring recipients’ adequate and most efficient access to information 
products), and that this flexibility should include trumping property rights 
by contract rights. While free market economies generally support 
                                                                                                                     
 234.  See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 1225, 1233–35 (arguing that the “bundle 
of rights” theories about property have facilitated a greater blurriness between property and 
contracts, in the broader context of vanishing personal property rights in copies of copyright 
works). See id. at 1233–34 (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property /Contract 
Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001)) (stating “[i]f property rights are nothing more than in 
personam right writ large, we should expect property law to embrace the same flexibility and 
granularity we see in the realm of privately negotiated agreements.”). 
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flexibility and creativity in how suppliers commercialize their products, 
allegedly allowing market dynamics to play out for the benefit of all, this 
line of argument fails to account for a few important points. First, it 
presupposes that property interests are infinitely malleable at the whim 
of suppliers’ preferences, which is problematic both legally and 
normatively. If the information product as supplied has the substantive 
characteristics of being owned by the recipient, terms of contract that 
state the contrary should not be taken at face value. In other words, 
favoring suppliers’ flexibility in how they craft their business offering 
should not occur at the expense of legal and normative coherence, and 
recipients’ reasonable expectations. How the creation of double standards 
in property, copyright and intellectual property law particularly 
undermines the public policy considerations that withstand the scope of 
copyright, is a factor that should not be ignored. Second, suppliers retain 
much flexibility in how they may deploy their commercial offerings (e.g., 
supply of goods, services, lease, rental, hire, sale, limited term, for 
specific uses and territory) without having to unilaterally declare that 
recipients have no property rights if de facto, property interests they have. 
Third, the alleged market efficiency that supposedly benefits all parties 
needs to be weighed against the decrease of efficiency occasioned by 
idiosyncratic rights and interests created by contract terms as opposed to 
more homogeneous property rights and interests.  
Once the relevant criteria to assert tangible property interests in 
information products have been identified, and once the potential perils 
of failing to recognize such property interests are acknowledged, what 
tools are available to legislators and the judiciary to constrain contract 
terms seeking to trump the property interests of information product 
recipients? It is beyond the scope of this article to give a detailed account 
of what legal tools and doctrines may allow courts and legislators to 
constrain the effect of contract terms on the property interests in 
information products. Suffice here for our purposes to highlight some of 
the mostly relevant tools.  
First, the numerus clausus principle, by which there is a fixed and 
closed list of property rights recognized by law and, as a corollary, 
limitations on how property rights may be altered by contract,235 is one 
tool that may equip the judiciary (and eventually legislators through 
legislative reform) in constraining contract terms that seek to alter the 
rights of recipients of information products to an unrecognizable form of 
property. This concept is generally understood to be part of the civil law 
tradition, although it is not immune from inconsistencies in its 
application.236 The civil law typically enumerates the entitlements of 
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ownership237 and its possible dismemberments.238 The restriction on “the 
exercise of the right to dispose of property” is explicitly prohibited except 
in limited circumstances,239 and is subject to specific conditions.240 There 
is a growing recognition that a similar principle exists in property 
common law,241 although this is not without controversy.242 Thomas 
Merrill and Henry Smith conducted a survey on the common law of 
property to demonstrate that the same principle exists in this legal 
tradition, although not uniformly and without bearing any specific 
appellation.243 For Merrill and Smith, numerus clausus is best described 
as a “norm of judicial self-governance” rather than as a statutory or 
constitutional tool of interpretation.244 It is “an extremely important 
qualification of the freedom of contract.”245 The survey that Merrill and 
Smith conducted on the common law of property led them to conclude 
that there were even fewer forms of property available for personal 
property than for real property.246 In other words, there is a greater level 
of standardization in the realm of personal property than with respect to 
real property. As Merrill and Smith argue, the justifying benefit of 
numerous clausus is to constrain information processing costs of all 
personal property owners of similar copies of information products and, 
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 243.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 241, at 9–23. 
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law much like a canon of interpretation, albeit a canon that applies to common-law decision 
making rather than statutory or constitutional interpretation, or like a strong default rule in the 
interpretation of property rights.”). 
 245.  Id. at 5. 
 246.  Id. at 17–18. 
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at a broader level, of all personal property owners in a given 
jurisdiction.247  
The application of the numerus clausus principle may be even more 
needed with respect to products without a physical object, where the 
boundaries between property and contract are more porous and where the 
rights of the recipient to the product may be harder to define.248 In the 
context of copyright, it is one way to qualify copyright holders’ freedom 
of contract to balance copyright holders’ interests against the competing 
interests of copy owners. It constrains copyright holders’ possible 
inclination to expand their property rights at the expense of personal 
property copy owners.249 It mediates between competing property rights 
and the effect that contracts can have on those rights.250 
Moreover, the doctrine that condemns restrictions against alienation 
of property (which may also be viewed as one manifestation of the 
numerus clausus principle) would provide a rationale to constrain 
contract terms that restrict the right to transfer the information product to 
another party save the original buyer, a prevailing practice in the 
commercialization of information products. As one commentator put it 
assessing the property attributes of members’ rights to virtual world 
assets and attempts to constrain such property rights by contract:  
To state that such [contracts] presumptively knock out any 
emergent property rights is to beg the question: why should we 
permit consensual agreements that prevent formation of property 
rights in the first instance any more than we tolerate other 
consensual restraints on alienation? The function of property law 
is in large part to resist contractual limitations on property use. If 
the restraint on alienation limits the property in question to low-
value uses, we term it an unreasonable restraint, and do not enforce 
it. Thus, property law provides a rationale and a mechanism for 
resisting the systematic expropriation of emergent online property 
forms by use of contract.251 
The limitation against constraints on alienation of property was the 
main rationale leading the U.S. Supreme Court to enunciate the principles 
of the first sale doctrine in the landmark judgment Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
                                                                                                                     
 247.  Id. at 26.  
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Isidor Straus,252 later codified in the U.S. Copyright Act.253  
What is more, targeted legislative measures, including making certain 
exceptions to copyright infringement mandatory (or the rights or 
privileges they create inalienable), or creating presumptions of invalidity 
against contract terms that would seek to limit the application of 
exceptions to infringement, are other means to qualify right holders’ 
freedom to commercialize information products.254  
V. CONCLUSION 
Information products traditionally embed a divide between the 
intangible personal property (that belongs to intellectual property right 
holders) and the tangible personal property of copies of information 
products (that belong, but not always, to their recipients). The 
dematerialization of copies brings another layer of complexity to the 
tangible and intangible property divide: the information products that are 
offered with a physical supporting medium are regulated differently than 
the ones that are not, through public and private ordering. This 
demarcation line is to a large extent arbitrary, resulting in unfair to double 
standards as well as legal and normative incoherence if not degradation. 
It contributes to the imbalance of power between suppliers and recipients.  
While the over emphasis on the presence of a physical object is 
attributable in part to a narrow understanding of tangible, there is hope 
for a more reasoned delineation between tangible and intangible property 
that does not altogether abandon this classification (which does in fact 
offer conceptual value to a better understanding of property and still plays 
a role in various areas of law). Taking a substantive and functional 
approach to the attributes of tangible personal property, regardless of the 
presence of a physical object, helps to realign the co-existence between 
tangible and intangible property in many ways. It affirms that information 
products may qualify as goods in some instances and distinguishes them 
from services. The substantive and functional approaches to tangible 
personal property identify situations when personal property in the 
information product should reside with the recipient, not the supplier.  
A functional similarity approach to digital copies of information 
products, whether delivered online or embedded in a physical object, 
accords with the principle of technological neutrality applied in 
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Entertainment Software Association.255 It preserves the competing 
property interests in the copy of the information product, which in turn 
justify many exceptions to copyright infringement.256  
Contract terms that ban personal property rights to recipients of 
information products should be subjected to heightened scrutiny. Not 
taking at face value contract terms that deny personal property rights to 
recipients of information products will have rippling effects on the 
application of the first sale or exhaustion doctrine, as well as other 
exceptions to copyright infringement. Advocating that contract terms 
banning personal property rights to recipients of information products 
should be subject to higher scrutiny is a plea against the infinite 
malleability of property. Just as property continues to be a powerful legal 
and normative tool for suppliers to promote their interests, the force it 
carries to protect the interests of recipients of information products needs 
to be equally recognized. 
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2015] THE UNDUE RELIANCE ON PHYSICAL OBJECTS 121 
 
 
